

SHAPED BY THE PANTHEISTIC¹ IDEOLOGY OF THE FOUNDERS, TÜRKIYE² HAS USED ITS NATIONAL EDUCATION CURRICULUM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING.

Ismail HASKARA

Despite centuries of conservative ideology inspired by Islam, the rapid economic development and consecutive military victories of the West had caused within the ranks of the Ottoman elite an inferiority complex generating a wave of admiration resulting in the emulation of European values. Emerging with reinforced positivist doctrines after being deeply influenced by the French revolution, this admiration turned into an irreligious political ideology creating a decentralizing effect on the ruling sultanate of the Ottoman state. After the Republic was founded in 1923, the Kemalist state ideology was imposed onto Turkish society in the form of an aggregation of materialism, social Darwinism, positivism, secularism, and Turkish nationalism. To socially engineer a modern, secular, temporal and materially prosperous nation, this ideology would in most ways carry manifestations of the very character and lifestyles of the Republic's founders. To maintain this ideology, assertive secularism was adopted as a security measure to prevent both the re-emergence of Islamic conservatism and any other nationalist or political ideology. While the visual aspects of Islamic society were transformed into a uniform Western society through mandatory reforms, the intellectual shift from East to West was realised by means of social engineering and religious inculturation through the education curriculum. This article will portray how the founders' belligerent belief towards Eastern-Islamic tradition motivated them towards a new Western looking secular order and how these ideas have been imposed through school textbooks.

KEYWORDS: Kemalism,³ assertive secularism, Türkiye, social Darwinism, positivism, nationalism, Islam, Religion, social engineering, modernism.

1. INTRODUCTION AND ARGUMENT

Roth (2015:1) claims that throughout history “ideas of knowledge, politics and ethics have continuously been intertwined with religious faith and practice”. Thus, it seems meaningless to push religion and cultural values aside to leave a huge moral gap of religious inculturation susceptible to vulnerability. Furthermore, Williams (2007) contends that in teaching

literature, there is an educational imperative to teach the knowledge of religion alongside it. However, the existence of any prolonged political power suggests that some ideological resistance against the *ancien regime*³ would inevitably emerge (Foucault 1990; Kuru 2008). Such resistance would inevitably turn out to be either a deviant understanding of the existing faith, a non-religious ideology, a secularist resistance, or an alternative doctrine in the form of an amalgamation of the first three (Kuru 2008). One example of the emergence of such a resistance is that of Türkiye. After a millenia of Muslim-Turkish history involving much interaction with the ever strengthening secular and Christian West, this prolonged period of admiring interaction has resulted in a counterculture of a politics of lifestyle arousing heated debate in Türkiye's relationship with society, religion, politics, and ethics.

While scholars such as Charles Taylor and Böckenförde contend that secularism enhances modernism which is meant to lead to material gain and increased personal liberties, in the case of Türkiye this has not been realised (Bilgin 2008). Historically inspired by Western influence and encouraged by the founders' pantheistic ideology, assertive secularism has been implemented as a security measure to not only Westernise Türkiye through social engineering, but also maintain its recently adopted Western identity. Artificial and imitative, this implementation was enforced without public consultation by means of a charismatic leader⁴ and System Justification Beliefs (SJB)⁵. To conceal the visual aspects of the Islamic society, its long-existent normative values such as traditional attire and the national alphabet were selectively prohibited to allow more space for Western symbols. While enforcing non-Muslim and Western aspects onto Muslim Turkish society, the visibility of Islam and the Muslim East were selectively targeted and confined (Topal 2012). To understand the underlying reasons behind Türkiye's polarised state, recognising the role the CUP⁶ and Young Turks⁷ played in shaping Turkish secularism is intrinsic. While divulging the link between Islam and secularism, this article attempts to clarify that Kemalism was disseminated to the masses in the form of social engineering through enforced social reforms and the education curricula. After primary textual sources such as school textbooks and certain books of propaganda of the founding regime are analysed through discourse and content analysis, the article will then put forward an alternative understanding of secularism that offers more social cohesion.

In societies that have not been able to find cohesion in the relation between religion and politics, the friction created from this unrest can generate resistance from both the enchanted⁸ (conservative) and the disenchanting (secular) peripheries. While secularists will resist when their perceived or real personal liberties provided for them by the state are under threat, the conservatives will resist when their religious freedoms are restricted under the pretext of assertive secularism. Instead of providing a social order of mutual benefit, Turkish secularism has for decades been inequitable and discriminatory creating social resistance. Rather than equally protecting the rights and liberties of both the aforementioned peripheries, to promote the Western looking appearance of Turkish society, the state has unilaterally securitised the conservative periphery to conceal the visibility of Islam (Bilgin 2008; Yilmaz 2021). One such resistance in Türkiye was during the late 1990s⁹ when conservatives protested against the restriction of personal liberties imposed against them after they were asked to conceal from the social sphere their Islamic attire, namely the headscarf. Rather than securitizing any particular periphery through the control account

of assertive secularism, the accommodationist account of passive secularism is ideally meant to allow enough space in society where “the state safeguards its institutions’ neutrality and separation from religion” (Watters 2018: 372). An order of horizontal power sharing with passive secularism that allows more space for various lifestyles is recommended for free societies (Taylor 2007; Böckenförde 1967; Topal 2012; Kuru 2008).

2. THE CUP AND THE YOUNG TURKS, THEIR IDEOLOGIES AND ROLE IN SHAPING THE FUNDAMENTALS OF TURKISH STATE IDEOLOGY

Named after Kemal Atatürk, the founder of Modern Türkiye, the fundamentals of Turkish state ideology (Kemalism) take its inspiration from the core ideals of the CUP, the political party that overthrew the Ottoman sultan Abdulhamid II¹⁰ in 1909 (Yılmaz 2021). Hanioglu (2001) contends the Young Turks’ ideology was an amalgamation of scientism, materialism, social Darwinism, positivism, secularism, and Turkish nationalism. In repudiating conservatism, during CHP’s second congress of 15–20 October 1927, Atatürk claimed that “nowhere in history has there been an example where the politics of Islamism has been successful” (Giritli 1980: 18). Atatürk has demonstrated his passion towards CUP ideology on numerous occasions and some clear examples of such rhetoric is: “I do not leave space for any dogma, any rule frozen in time as spiritual heritage. My spiritual heritage is science and reason” (Giritli 1980: 18). One similar statement by Atatürk is “Our true mentor in life is science” (Giritli 1980: 22).

Inculcated by notable figures like the German military theorist Colmar von der Goltz, the founders¹¹ were convinced that it was the duty of military officers to go beyond their traditional roles and guide the state and society to achieve the much-needed social change (Yılmaz 2021). Goltz is the author of the Social Darwinist book *Das Volk in Waffen (A Nation in Arms)* which argues that war was inevitable. Known as one of Germany’s major theorists of warfare, Goltz was sent to Türkiye as a military officer in June 1883. Extensively contributing to the modernisation of the Turkish army during World War 1, Goltz gained the admiration of many young Turkish military officers. He modernized the army so effectively that Türkiye was decisively winning the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 until the major European powers intervened (Brittanica 2021). It was leaders with such ideological motivations that drove the modernist and positivist Young Turks¹² such as Atatürk to force the dethroning of the Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II, paving the way for the commencement of the Second Constitutionalist Period¹³ of the Empire. After 1923, mandatory reforms were implemented by the Republic’s founding elite to maintain the new regime’s existence, “Power holders process information and make decisions that help them to maintain their position in the hierarchy by sustaining or increasing their degree of control over resources” (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson 2003; Kipnis 1976).

Apart from scientism, materialism, social Darwinism, positivism and nationalism, another ideological source of inspiration embraced by the CUP and Young Turks was a mid-nineteenth-century German ideology known as Vulgärmaterialismus. “Fusing materialism, scientism, and social Darwinism into a simplistic creed, it maintained that science must have a leading role in society while religion must be rejected” (Hanioglu 2011: 48–49). The logic

behind Vulgärmaterialismus was to engineer a rational, irreligious, and prosperous society (Yılmaz & Ertürk 2021; Bilgin 2008). Deeply influenced, young Ottoman intellectuals during the late 19th and early 20th centuries started to accuse Islam, claiming that it hindered reform (Cündioğlu 1996; Kılıçarslan 2014). As the fundamental source of normativity in Ottoman society, such accusations against Islam demonstrate the existence of an inferiority complex aroused by the rapid military and economic development of the West. Being social Darwinists, the Ottoman elite seemed to be unconcerned by the intrinsic role of how colonialisation and slavery had unjustly contributed to the rise of the West (Heblich, Redding & Voth 2023).

Inspired by the cultural, economic, and political parameters of European nationalism, the founders forged a secular, racist version of Turkish nationalism. Ottomanism¹⁴ was deemed as an impractical attempt to form a uniform identity based on citizenship and “neglecting the name of the Turk was an attempt to erase it from the face of the earth” (Akdag 2005: 41). Repudiating Ottomanism, the book “There is no religion, there is the nation” by Ruşeni Barkın¹⁵ is a sublime example that outlines Turkish nationalist ideology. Traumatized after consecutive military defeats the Ottoman Empire sustained during the Balkan wars¹⁶ and World War I, nationalism was especially bolstered after the state had lost vast quantities of land to minorities they had for centuries controlled. Backed by the major European powers, the Ottoman minorities had successfully attained and established their modern, nationalist, and secular states. Apart from loss of land and the physical and psychological wounds inflicted upon its population, the horrendous conditions imposed by the treaty of Sèvres¹⁷ had traumatized the Ottoman intellectuals even further (Yılmaz 2021). Such traumas helped bolster the formation of this security orientated ideology (Kemalism) which later evolved to become “the constitutive creed of a secular and modern Turkish nation state” (Yeğen 2007: 120; Hanioglu 2011: 161). In its early years, the espousment of Turkish nationalism was to become a pretext and a driving force in creating the desired Republic that would strive to confine or erase the visual aspects of the Muslim-East.

3. SECULARISM AS A SECURITY MEASURE IN ASCERTAINING TÜRKİYE’S MISSION OF WESTERNISATION

Numerous scholars have emphasised that admiration is a factor which motivates individuals to emulate (Zagzebski 2010: 54). In understanding the founders’ ideological motivations, the intrinsic role of Western admiration is arguably the core driving factor. Ever since the Ottoman Empire started to stagnate and decline against the ever-strengthening West, Turkish history has witnessed severe admiration leading to emulation. Schroeder (2010: 42); Angress, (1972: 168) and Archer (2018: 140) have all supported Zagzebski’s claim that “admiration leads to emulation”. It was after the founding of the Republic that this emulation took a more forceful turn and came to be presented to the people as revolutionary reforms. Angress, (1972: 59) claims that “admiration, rather than being motivating, is a paralyzing emotion”. This paralyzing emotion has manifested on Turkish society through mandatory Western reforms where Turkish society was asked to put aside its traditions and adopt the new state ideology forged for them. The promotion of the state to emulate the West through

admiration has caused a hybrid identity where a vast majority of the Turkish population have neither been able to hold on to their own values, or become Western. Contrary to state ideology, Turkish conservatives argue that Türkiye should be more selective and only adopt and imitate things that are not contrary to their cultural and religious values. The prominent late journalist Uğur Mumcu has stated that the Turkish citizen is someone that “marries according to Swiss law, is penalised according to German law, ruled according to French law and buried according to Islamic law” (Bozgeyik 2018). Archer adds clarity to the case of Türkiye by claiming that “The desire to emulate, then, is a desire to possess for ourselves the features we admire in the other person” (2018: 140). In support of this, Zavalısz has claimed that the main reason why some Turks converted to Christianity is that they are “more interested in becoming Western, rather than becoming Christian” (Zavalısz 2012: 192).

Contrary to the belief that the secular state provides freedoms, the control aspect of Turkish secularism was adopted as a security measure to ensure that the recently founded Republic maintained its newly adopted Western appearance (Bilgin 2008; Gözaydın 2008; Topal 2012; Lewis 2002). Deemed by the founders as the best political and social arrangement for keeping Turkey safe, the Kemalist elites argued that so long as the Turkish state has control over religious institutions, it could prevent challenges to the state from both inside and outside the country (Bilgin 2008). Thus, with anxiety of returning to its undesired former state in their psyche, the founders’ case for Türkiye’s turning to assertive secularism is best described as a “recourse to discourses of danger” (Bilgin 2008: 600). To ascertain the longevity of the state ideology, the founders believed that the state’s population needed to possess the positivist, materialist, Darwinist, and pantheistic values which the founders themselves carried (Yılmaz 2021).

With the desire for visual, Western looking change, the founding of the secular state in 1923 did not mean that the power of the state would be distributed to the masses who still were not Western enough. Since achieving the material gain aspect of secularism was crucial, any hindrance in the course of secularisation carried a threat of failing to “achieve success in the material world” (Davison 1998: 165; Parla & Davison 2004: 118–125; Bilgin 2008: 600). This anxiety could be read as “a response to non-military and non-specific security concerns rooted in the ambivalence of European/international society toward Türkiye’s difference” (Bilgin 2008: 600). Manifesting both the level of social polarisation and the anxiety of the possibility of Türkiye repudiating its Western appearance, Yavuz (2003: 46) asserts that Türkiye has historically considered “large sections of its own society¹⁸, rather than foreign countries, as its main threat”. Although Bilgin defines Türkiye’s anxiety as non-specific, the founder’s desire to become visually Western is clear indication of their animosity towards the Eastern/Arab aspects of Türkiye’s past, making their concerns somewhat specific. This concern is still manifested through caricatures portraying the imam as either ugly, unintelligent, or malevolent.¹⁹

4. NEWLY FOUNDED REPUBLIC, CHARISMATIC LEADER, AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION BELIEF (SJB)

Another security aspect of Türkiye's secularism is against the real or perceived threat of not only religion, but also alternative visions that contradict "the founding leaders' vision of transformation by control" (Bilgin 2008: 598). Turkish state ideology would not tolerate certain others that would undermine the principles founded by the charismatic leader Atatürk, ideologies such as "religious fundamentalism, Kurdish separatism and deviant ideologies" (Çifci 2013: 6–8). However, since it was mainly Islam that carried visual aspects contrary to Western lifestyle, "religious fundamentalism stood out as the most principal threat to secularism" (Çifci 2013: 6). The prominent historian Bernard Lewis²⁰ (2002: 261) claims that Atatürk's radical changes, even the changing of the capital city from Istanbul to Ankara were "actions against the new Türkiye's past". The founders' adoption of assertive secularism and the marginalisation of the values of the Islamic ancien regime²¹ has consequently divided Turkish society into two. This division has created the desired and the tolerated citizens who chose to conform to the regime's mandatory changes, versus the failed, liminal, and undesired citizens who chose to hold on to their conservative values (Anderson 2013; Yılmaz 2021).

Systems Justification Beliefs is an ideology which shares its roots in biological determinism and reinforces inequality (based on gender, race, or class) "mediated by system justification beliefs (SJB), outcomes included support for Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton as president, justifying police brutality" (Rudman & Saud (2020: 1139). In attempting to create the desired citizen (LAST),²² the Turkish state has consequently created certain groups as liminal citizens, failed citizen and the tolerated citizen as outlined by Anderson (2013). Since, for the founders, a pious and religious way of life carried the visual aspects of Islam and is consequently deemed contrary to the Western way of life, the state forged uniform ideology would in no way tolerate certain others. In the Weberian context of charismatic authority, society for the individual has to a great extent become a society of convenience where the world is split into two: those for versus those against the state ideology. Under these constraints, a uniform Turkish society with limited space for personal development has been predetermined for its people by the founding regime, leaving them entrapped under ideological parameters. This process has led to an unconscious, militarist, secular periphery who believe that they are the custodians of the nation, "that any alternative belief or lifestyle is a voice of hostility" (Yavuz & Ozcan 2007: 120).

As mentioned in the March of the Tenth Anniversary,²³ Türkiye has aimed to socially engineer a new human through imitation of Western values (Yılmaz 2021). Those who resisted state ideology were deemed undesired citizens and deprived of critical positions within the state (Yılmaz 2021). A clear example of this has been the decades long unjust grading system imposed on the Imam Hatip Schools. In his article *Let's Go to Imam Hatip Schools*,²⁴ Şevki Yılmaz highlights one of the greatest struggles Erdoğan has had to deal with. Although there was no headscarf ban in the Turkish constitution, under SJB, it was still banned by certain institutions of the secular establishment such as the Institution of Higher Education (YÖK). So that the "non-Western" [for emphasis] conservative periphery would be excluded from the social sphere, Türkiye has overwhelmingly imposed Western morals pushing for a secular, rational and a visually Western identity compatible with the project

of modernity (Yılmaz 2021). Benefits of full citizenship could not be enjoyed unless one adopted the secular, Turkish state ideology of the newly founded state, a mirror image of the materialist, positivist, secular, and nationalist ideology and character of the charismatic leader Kemal Ataturk (Lewis 2002).

5. THE DISSEMINATION OF THE FOUNDERS' IRRELIGIOSITY BEING PROMULGATED TO THE MASSES THROUGH SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS

To understand how the founders perceived the religion of Islam and why they were so obsessed with Westernisation, primary government document sources and school textbooks will be analysed. Among others, certain pages from four books, *The Fundamentals of Turkish History*²⁵ (Inan et al. 1930), three school textbooks; *History 1* (1931), *History 2* (1931) and *Knowledge of Civilization for the Citizen* (1931) will be analysed by their content and discourse on the founders' perception of religion and Islam. Furthermore, *The Complete Works of Ataturk* (2008) is a multi-volume compilation of almost every genuine piece of work known to have been written by Ataturk, including his handwritten notes, letters, and official state documents. Also, prepared under Atatürk's instructions, (Inan et al. 1930) is regarded as the official historical, political, social, and cultural doctrine of the CHP and the modern Turkish state. Written and published with extraordinary speed,²⁶ the *History 1* (1931) and *History 2*²⁷ (1931) textbooks are perfect examples of how the Pantheism in (Inan et al. 1930) is manifested to the public through the national curriculum.

The sincere belief that the *ancien regime* lacked the renaissance and the enlightenment to enhance personal development for the purpose of self-discovery and creativity had led the founders to seek change through education. This belief pushed them to determine definitive perimeters around religion through secularism "pointing to education as the main battlefield in state-religion controversies" (Kuru 2007: 569). The following examples demonstrate how "materialist and positivist ideas had been imposed to the masses through the Turkish national education curricula" (Akdag 2005: 41). As the Republic's official ideology, page 2 of (Inan et al. 1930) clearly states that all sacred verses are imitations of the Torah, and that science is superior to revelation. In stark contrast to the concept of revelation²⁸ in Islam which states that the verses of the Quran have directly descended from God and have nothing to do with the Prophet's personal opinion,²⁹ *History 1* (90–91) school textbook claims the Qur'an is the Prophet's personal opinion.

5.1. The founders' belief that Christianity is more secular than Islam

The founders' admiration for the West had gone to such extremes that school textbooks started to praise Christianity over Islam. Claiming that the prophet Jesus was more secular than Prophet Muhammad, the book contends "Jesus did not interfere in state matters" (*History 2* 1931: 67). The main difference between the two religions was outlined as "Christianity is not a worldly religion, it did not interfere in state matters and when it did, it had to withdraw" (*History 2* 1931: 67). It is this alleged aspect of Christian (Western) culture,

the regime contending that while Christianity is secular, Islam is not, that manifests as the most significant difference between the East and West (*History 2* 1931). This alleged difference between the two prophets, religions and consequently two separate cultures is latently indicated as justification for assertive secularism as “a need for a reinterpretation and application of secularism” (*History 2* 1931: 67). Thus, according to the state, Islam needed to be controlled and confined to either the private sphere or the mosque building because unlike Christianity, it was not secular. Representing the visual aspects of Islam, the Ottoman sultanate and the Caliphate were consequently seen as the significant markers of the difference and the obstacle to reform. The founders’ narrative for regime change was unless this regime was not replaced with a secular order, this traditionally Islamic society could not be transformed into a rational, irreligious, prosperous and progressive nation. A crucial part of this transformation was the adaptation of Western laws “to reach the level of contemporary civilisation, it was compulsory to adopt the laws of Western nations” (Ataay 1973: 201–202). Implying that the ancient regime was primitive, the laws adopted from the West were introduced into Turkish society as “Turkish Civilised law” [for emphasis].

5.2. The founders’ belief of man having created God

Since the founders’ doctrines were pantheistic and contradicted the majority Muslim population’s doctrines of creation and revelation, Turkish state ideology has never received grassroots support (Yilmaz 2021). In striking similarity to the earlier stated book³⁰, the book (*History 1*), under the chapter Zeka (Intelligence) denies the existence of divine revelation (*wahy*):³¹ “it needs to be understood that all knowledge of belief is the product of human intelligence” (1931: 2). Claiming religion is the product of human intelligence can also be interpreted as man having created God and religion. In page 10, the existence of God is again renounced by stating that “any claim of a creator other than nature itself is a creation of the imagination” (Inan et al. 1930). This idea is clearly demonstrated in the statement, “the concept of divinity and its perimeters is a creation of mankind’s intellect” (Inan et al. 1930: 55). Expressed a little differently, this disbelief of God’s existence is clearly disseminated in *History 1* as “While intelligence is the guide to understanding nature, all beliefs, ideas and concepts that are perceived to be above nature are fabrications created by mankind himself” (2). Maintaining that God is a creation of human intellect, the concept of monotheism is stated as “the product of politics that transformed polytheism into monotheism” (*Ataturk’ün Bütün Eserleri*, vol. 24: 43–44). To the founders, it was the social, cultural, and political environment that forced the shift towards monotheism. In a chapter *fabricated stories: how religion was born*,³² religion is defined as “something that evolved over time. While there was no concept of religion in early man, over time, as societies developed, the concept of a creator emerged, that it was human intelligence that created God” (*History 1* 1931: 23).

The book *Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler*³³ (*Knowledge of Civilization for the Citizen*) by Afet was first published by the Turkish Ministry of Education on 9 July 1931. Like the others, this book propagates the state’s ideology on culture, civilisation, politics, and religion. Although the author was originally titled as Afet Inan, on more recent publications the author is titled Atatürk. In the foreword, Afet Inan provides information to the reader in

regards how the book was written: “With distinguished intellectuals around him such as politicians, writers, lawyers and military personnel, most of the ideas in the book originated from around Atatürk’s dining table” (Gürses 2010: 237). While contending in the book that the nation had to be ruled under both political and ideological tutelage, the concept of morality has been separated from the realm of religion and replaced with nationalism³⁴ (Gürses 2010: 243). Nationalism is promoted in the book as “Having joined their motivations to become a society, the Turkish people have come from a rich history and culture” (*Medeni Bilgiler* 1931: 43). Also, in page 20 of the same book, the state is defined as a power that has obtained legitimacy over a certain area or region (Hoffman, et al. 2017). Republished under the name of Atatürk in 1969, 1988 and 1998 as *Medeni Bilgiler*, worth quoting at length, Inan summarizes in the epilogue the context of how the book was written: “Having taken Atatürk’s handwritten notes as evidence, his ideas will now have their place in history. The book provides space for incidents that I have personally witnessed which comforts me in that I am fulfilling my responsibility towards history. Having discussed such issues with Atatürk and his friends and then publishing them under my name has given me extra motivation to fulfill my tasks.”³⁵

Along the lines of pantheism, the book states “when humans began to understand that nature was greater than everything, they, who are the children of nature, began to better comprehend their own greatness”.³⁶ The book continues to tackle the conservative parameters of religion (Islam) by contending that “nature necessitates humans to unconditionally use and develop the abilities it has bestowed to them.”³⁷ In a tradition of both pantheism and paganism³⁸ and holding deep reverence for the world and nature, the above words “nature being greater than everything” [for emphasis] can easily be considered as an alternative narrative that replaces God (Allah) with nature. Deeming humans as the children of nature, the book provides humans with an ancillary kind of divinity, an alternative understanding of closeness to God (Leftow 2016). Much in line with pantheism, these views can also be deemed as a combination of how materialism and positivism view religion. In other words, restricted to the perimeters of the physical world, there is no God, no religion, no spiritualism; everything exists within the parameters of this physical world.

As part of the official pantheistic ideology of the Republic, the concept of the creator is that nature and the universe created their own selves which mankind is a part of, implying that God and the Universe are identical (Leftow 2016). Then, in order to put meaning to the forces around him, mankind created his own beliefs which God is a part of. In 1934, the Minister of the Interior Şükrü Kaya announced that with the advancement of science and technology which has provided answers to most of mankind’s questions, religion has come to a stage where it is no longer needed.³⁹ *Akliselim*⁴⁰ (*Common Sense*), originally written by Baron d’Holbach and titled *Le Bon Sens, ou Idées naturelles opposées aux idées surnaturelles*, was given to Atatürk as a gift by its translator Abdullah Cevdet, a prominent atheist of the time (1920s). Written to refute all aspects of religion such as revelation, prophethood, life hereafter etc, this book was much appreciated by the founders (Çeçen 2020). In the book called, *There is no religion. There is nationality*, Barkın claims in the foreword that he wrote it to demonstrate the true face of religion, to free his people of this misfortune (Barkın 2000). Barkın places nationalism above religion by emphasising that their holy book is nationalism which embraces happiness, unites Turks and enhances knowledge (Ibid.).

Ataturk emphasising that he only believes in what he can see and grasp, that the physical world holds all the answers to questions he may want answered is clearly indicative of his belief in pantheism. Thus, it can be argued that this materialist, socially Darwinist and philosophical approach of clinging to the physical is another justification for the material gain aspect of secularism that motivated the founders towards these assertive reforms. With inspiration from Turkish nationalism, the founders went as far as to philosophically lay claim to secularism by contending that it did not originate from France, that its origins came from Turks themselves.⁴¹ Although Turkish nationalism was seemingly the driving factor, the adoption of the Latin alphabet suggests that the desire for Westernisation was a stronger motivational force for the founders. If Turkishness had truly been prioritised, the founders would have adopted the traditional Göktürk alphabet over the Latin script. A clear example of nationalism based on race and history is the state of Israil's readoption of the ancient Hebrew alphabet. Rather than imitating through admiration, soon after their state was founded in 1948, Israil chose to readopt its ancient script.

While the regime has continuously claimed that secularism is the separation of religion from state affairs, the state has always used the assertive control aspect of it. The former minister of the interior, Şükrü Kaya, had claimed during the early years of the Republic that "the duty of religion had ceased to exist"⁴². Such contradictory rhetoric raises the question: "if the duty of religion has ceased to exist, then why does it need to be controlled?" [for emphasis]. Kaya also reemphasises the control factor of secularism by contending that "Our intention behind secularism is that we do not want, and we will not allow religion to interfere with state matters. We want religion to be restricted to within the perimeters of places of worship."⁴³ A prominent academic of the Republic, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, has defended Turkish secularism to the extent of social Darwinism and System Justification Belief (SJB) by announcing "the state's use of violence can be justified if it has to separate religion from state affairs" (Öztürk 2020: 288).

6. TÜRKIYE'S REASSESSMENT OF SECULARISM

Emphasising the importance of normative values within society, in 1978 Böckenförde wrote an article about *The State as an ethical State*, "asking whether the state ought to, and even could provide such an ethical substance" (Künkler & Stein 2018" 7). Demonstrating the importance of passive secularism, Foucault outlines what he calls a shift from repressive sovereign power to productive pastoral power (Hacking 1985). Thus, an inclusive and open-ended society is what Türkiye has historically lacked. When a process of authentic exercise of democratic constituent power is realised, religious freedoms will disseminate more freely⁴⁴ (Böckenförde 1967). Since power sharing in democratic societies is one of the most heated topics of the last few decades, realising a fully democratic system requires more than just a constitution, parliament, and other governmental institutions. Contrary to the assertive, the passive version of secularism provides more social space for both the secular and the conservative peripheries within the state.

Worth remembering that assertive secularism in general is not necessarily compatible with democracy, freedom, or any similar modernist term; versions of it as in the former

USSR or Maoist China have been as totalitarian as the strictest theocracy (Alrebh 2019). In this regard, societies that lack the dominating power of its own people will lack full democracy. As for the Weberian term of charismatic authority, secularism in the case of Türkiye can be better understood under the legality of the sublime values of the charismatic leader, Atatürk. Charismatic authority in Weber's formulation occurs "when an individual's special gifts of body and mind are acknowledged by others in society" (Dow 1978: 83). As a part of this heritage, the philosophical and political values of the CHP and Kemalist secularism are clearly outlined in the Turkish constitution. Although Turkish secularism has traditionally often been described as excluding certain peripheries from the public sphere, called "distancing neutrality" (Böckenförde 1973), Böckenförde recommends "Open neutrality (passive secularism) which allows for religion to develop in the public sphere, such as in the school, educational institutions, and in the public order [... It] seeks to create a balance in the secular goals of the state" (Künkler & Stein 2018: 10).

Like Türkiye, every nation on earth is to some extent linked to the debate on the relationship and parameters of religion and state. Many theories have been developed in regards what the parameters of religion in the secular order should be. Some of these theories focus on material development and "modernity through cultural, socioeconomic and political dynamics, ignoring the crucial role of religion due to their secularist bias" (Mutluer 2018: 2). Other theories like Böckenförde's theory of open neutrality and Taylor's theory on the Modern Order of Mutual Benefit⁴⁵ contend that the secular order needs to be neutral and also provide social space for its individuals. Taylor maintains that "the Modern Order of Mutual Benefit is meant to serve for the benefit of every citizen where both the buffered (secular) and the enchanted (religious) can lead their ordinary lives and pursue their own economic ends with confidence" (Sorban 2015: 177). In determining state neutrality, evaluating it under the framework as described by Böckenförde is useful, "a pioneer thinker on the relationship between law, religion, and politics" (Künkler & Stein 2018: 2). Considering Böckenförde's aphorism that "the liberal, secularized state lives from presuppositions that it cannot itself guarantee" (Kunker & Stein 2018: 2), Erdoğan's choice to shift from the decades long assertive secularism towards passive secularism demonstrates how pivotal Böckenförde's ideas on the foundations of statehood are. Thus, AK party's long period of political rule is a clear indication of the popular support it has received.

Similar to Böckenförde's article about 'The State as an Ethical State' [for emphasis], implying his support for natural law as well as positive law,⁴⁶ on 31 January 2012, Erdoğan emphasised that he wanted a pious youth (Canatan 2014). During his speech at the Islamic Cooperation Organisation in 2020, Erdoğan stressed, in line with the space offered by passive secularism, the importance of Islam to manifest in all aspects of life and not be restricted to the personal realm (Tüfekyapan 2020). Such rhetoric convinced much of Turkish society that Erdoğan was serious about transforming Türkiye's system of assertively secularism into an order of passive secularism (Künkler & Stein 2018). Although the Turkish constitution clearly indicates that it is a secular nation and even though the definitive parameters of secularism in the Turkish constitution have been defined,⁴⁷ Turkish society is still at loggerheads as to how it should be implemented.

CONCLUSION

In Eric Jan Zürcher's notable article "The Progressive Republican Party and Political Conservatism" the fundamental values of conservatism are outlined. These are commonly known as; the importance of religion, consulting the people, the importance of avoiding injustice on people when implementing reform and seeing society as an organism rather than a mechanism. Identifying society as an organism is particularly worthy of mention in that it denotes the necessity of consultation and approaching society without prejudice, values which Türkiye has historically lacked. Turkish secularism, on the other hand, is best understood under the Weberian term of charismatic authority where social, political, and religious legality has depended on the sublime values of one leader. Based on this, the doctrines of Kemalist secularism are clearly stated in the Turkish constitution. With little space for religion to develop freely, Turkish state ideology has seen religion not only as a political threat, but also as a cause of social, cultural, political, and economic decline. To prevent this perceived threat, mandatory reforms such as the banning of Muslim attire, the replacement of the Ottoman-Arabic alphabet with the current Latin based one and the replacement of the Arabic call to prayer with a Turkish translation of it were introduced. Consequently, intellectual reforms of social engineering through the national education system implementing the official irreligious ideology of the founders were promulgated into school textbooks. In line with state ideology, school textbooks clearly suggest that religion was not taught for moral development, rather to transfer a positivist definition of religion compatible to the irreligious ideology of the state. While instrumentalising assertive secularism as a security measure, the founders sought to Westernise future generations through the national education curriculum.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

- Akdag, H., 2005, *Content analysis of high school history books during the single party and the Democratic Party period of Türkiye* (Unpublished Masters Thesis Selcuk University. Institute of Social Sciences).
- Alrebh A., 2019, *Muslims, Secularism, and the State*, February 2019. DOI – 10.1007/978-3-319-73653-2_29-1.
- Anderson, Bridget, L. (2013). *Us and Them? The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Angrss, R. K., 1974, "Lessing, Mendelssohn, Nicolai: Briefwechsel Über Das Trauerspiel" University of Wisconsin Press, Monatshefte.
- Archer, Alfred. (2019). *Admiration and Motivation*. *Emotion Review*. Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 2019) 140–150. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073918787235>
- Ataay, A Atatürk'ün Laiklik Anlayışı ve Medeni Kanun, Cumhuriyet Döneminde Hukuk. (Secularism according to Atatürk and contemporary law, Law during the period of the Republic) İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi 50. Yıl Armağanı, İstanbul, 1973, s. 201–202.
- Atatürk, M. K., Acaroğlu, M. T., & Perinçek, S. (2008). *Atatürk'ün bütün eserleri: Cilt 23*. Galatasaray-İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları.
- Atatürk, M. K., Acaroğlu, M. T., & Perinçek, S. (2008). *Atatürk'ün bütün eserleri: Cilt 24*. Galatasaray-İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları.

- Atatürk, M. K., Arsan, N., Atatürk kültür, dil ve tarih yüksek kurumu (Turquie), & Atatürk araştırma merkezi (Turquie). (1989). Atatürk'ün söylev ve demeçleri: I-III. Ankara: Türk tarih kurumu basımevi.
- Atatürk, K. (1967). Nutuk. İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi.
- Atay, F.R., 2021, *Çankaya*, Pozitif Yayınları, İstanbul.
- Bardakci, M., 2002, *Meral Hanım "İktidara gelince ders kitabı yapacağız" dediği "Medenî Bilgiler"i acaba hiç okudu mu? (Has Meral Hanım actually read the Knowledge of Civilisation book that she claims she will reintroduce into schools when she comes to power?)* (April 2022). Retrieved on April 21, 2022 from <https://www.haberturk.com/yazarlar/murat-bardakci/3408646-meral-hanim-iktidara-gelince-ders-kitabi-yapacagiz-dedigi-meden-bilgileri-acaba-hic-okudu-mu>
- Barkın, R., 2000, "Din Yok Milliyet Var (There is no Religion. There is Nationality)", *Bilim ve Ütopya Dergisi*, Vol 68. (February 2000).
- Bilgin, P., 2008, "The Securityness of Secularism? The Case of Turkey", *Security Dialogue* 39(6) (2008): 593–614. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010608098211>.
- Böckenförde, E.W. 2018, "The Rise of The State as a Process of Secularization [1967]" in *2 Religion, Law, and Democracy: Selected Writings* (Mirjam Künkler & Tine Stein eds.,).
- Bozgeyik, B., 2018, *Dünyanın En Tuhaf Durumu* Retrieved on May 30th 2023 from <https://www.milligazete.com.tr/makale/1545935/burhan-bozgeyik/dunyanin-en-tuhaf-durumu>.
- Bridget, L.A., 2013, *Them and Us? The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia (2021, August 8). *Colmar, baron von der Goltz*. *Encyclopedia Britannica*. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Colmar-baron-von-der-Goltz>.
- Canatan, K., 2020, *İslam Terakkiye Mani midir?* Beyan Yayınları, İstanbul.
- Çeçen, F.I., 2021, *Ataturk'e Göre Tanrı/Allah Kavramı ve Yaratılış* [Video]. (2021, August 31). Retrieved on 1 May 2023 from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u3ZAPCjIEk>.
- Çiftci, K., 2013, "The Turkish State Ideology Hegemony in Türkiye and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as an 'Other'", *L'Europe en Formation*, 367(1): 143–169. doi:10.3917/eufor.367.0143.
- Cündioğlu, D. 1996, "Ernest Renan ve 'reddiyeler' bağlamında İslâm-bilim tartışmalarına bibliyografik bir katkı" (A bibliographical contribution to the debate between Islam and science in light of Ernst Renan's objections)", *Divan: Disiplinlerarası Çalışmalar Dergisi* (1996): 1–94.
- Davison, A., 1998, *Secularism and Revivalism in Türkiye: A Hermeneutic Reconsideration* Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
- Dow Jnr, T.E., 1978, "An Analysis of Weber's Work on Charisma", *The British Journal of Sociology*, 29(1): 83–93. <https://doi.org/10.2307/589221>.
- Foucault, M. and R. Hurley, 1990, *the History of Sexuality*. Trans. by Robert Hurley, Penguin, London.
- Foucault, Michel. (1983). "Subject and Power" in *Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rainow Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. University of Chicago Press.
- Giritli, İ., 1980, *Türk rejim ve ideolojisi (The Turkish Regime and Its Ideology)*. İstanbul University Publications, İstanbul.
- Gozaydin, I.B., 2008, "Diyamet and Politics", *the Muslim World* (Hartford), 98(2–3): 216–227. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-1913.2008.00220.x>.
- Gürses, F., 2010, *Kemalizm'in Model Ders Kitabı: Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler (Kemalism Model Lesson Book: Knowledge of Civilisation for the Citizen)*. Akademik Bakış, Cilt 4 Sayı 7, winter, 2010.
- Hacking, I., 1985, "Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow: 'Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics' (Book Review)", *the Journal of Philosophy*, Journal of Philosophy, Inc., New York.

- Hanioglu, M. ,Sükrü.(2001). Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hanioglu, M. ,Sükrü (2011). Ataturk: An Intellectual Biography. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press
- Heblich, S., Stephen Redding, S., & Voth, H., (2023). Slavery and the British Industrial Revolution. Retrieved on May 30th 2023 from URL: <https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/slavery-and-british-industrial-revolution>
- Hofmann E, Hartl B, Gangl K, Hartner-Tiefenthaler M and Kirchler E (2017) Authorities' Coercive and Legitimate Power: The Impact on Cognitions Underlying Cooperation. *Front. Psychol.* 8:5. Doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00005
- Inan, A., 1931, *Tarih 1 (History 1)*, Devlet Matbaası, Istanbul.
- Inan, A., 1931, *Tarih 2 (History 2)*, Devlet Matbaası, Istanbul.
- Inan, A., 1933, *Tarih 2 Orta Çağlar (History 2 Middle Ages)*, Devlet Matbaası, Istanbul.
- Inan, A., 1931, *Medeni Bilgiler, Liseler İçin (Knowledge of Civilisation for High Schools)*, Maarif Devlet Matbaası, Istanbul.
- Inan, et al., 1930, *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları (The Fundamentals of Turkish History)*, Maarif Devlet Matbaası, Yayın Yeri, Istanbul.
- Inceoğlu, N. (2020). *1933 Bir Yılın Hikayesi (1933 The Story of 1 Year)*. Yitik Ülke Publications. Bakırköy. Istanbul.
- Karaman, Hayrettin. (2021). Islam, Devlet, Düzen 2 (Islam, State and Order 2). Retrieved on September 19 2021 from URL: <https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/hayrettin-karaman/islam-devlet-duzen-2-2059637>
- Keltner, D., D.H. Gruenfeld, and C. Anderson, 2003, “Power, Approach, and Inhibition”, *Psychological Review*, 110(2): 265–84. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.110.2.265>.
- Kılıçarslan, I., 2014, *Islam hinders progress*. Retrieved on July 4th 2020 from <https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/ismailkilicarslan/islam-terakkiye-manidir-52435>.
- Kipnis, D. *The Powerholders*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Kuru, A.T., “Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles, and State Policies toward Religion”, *World Politics*, 59(4) (2007): 568–94. <https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2008.0005>.
- Künkler, M., & Tine, S., “Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde: Inner-Catholic Critic and Advocate of Open Neutrality”, *the Oxford Journal of Law and Religion*, 7(1): 1–12. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ojlr/rwy008>.
- Leftow, B., *Alternative Concepts of God: Essays on the Metaphysics of the Divine*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Lessing, G. E., Mendelssohn, M., & Nicolai, F. (1972). Briefwechsel über das Trauerspiel [Correspondence on tragedy] (J. Schulte-Sasse, Ed.). Munich, Germany: Winkler.
- Lewis, B., *The emergence of modern Türkiye*, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, London.
- Maddox, Marian. (2012). *Best of 2011: God under Gillard. ABC Religion & Ethics*. Retrieved on October 6.th 2021 from URL: <https://www.abc.net.au/religion/best-of-2011-god-under-gillard/10100862>
- Meydan, S. (2013). *Ataturk'e artık o iftirayı atamayacaklar(Never will they be able to back bite again)*. Retrieved on 24th August 2021from URL: <https://odatv4.com/analiz/muhafazakarlar-Ataturke-artik-o-iftirayi-atamayacak-0304131200-34090>
- Orta Mektep için Tarih 1 (History 1 for High School)*. (1933). Maarif Devlet Matbaası, Yayın Yeri: Istanbul
- Öztürk, H., A.F. Başgil and T.Z., “Tunaya’s speeches on secularism”, *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Ataturk Yolu Dergisi* Sayı: 66 (Spring 2020): 281–303.
- Parla, Taha & Andrew Davison, (2004). *Corporatist Ideology in Turkish state ideology Türkiye*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

- Perinçek, D. (2014). *Turkish state ideology Devrim 2 – Din Ve Allah (Turkish state ideology Revolution 2-Religion and God)*. Kaynak. Ankara.
- Roth, M., 2015, *Religion's Role in the History of Ideas*. Retrieved on May 6th 2023 from <https://www.wsj.com/articles/religions-role-in-the-history-of-ideas-1424465304>.
- Rudman, L. & Saud, L., 2020, "Justifying Social Inequalities: The Role of Social Darwinism," *Pers Soc Psychol Bull*, 46(7): 1139–1155.
- Şapolyo, B., E., (1958). *Kemal Atatürk ve Milli Mücadele Tarihi* (Kemal Atatürk and the History of the National Struggle. Rafet Zaimler. Istanbul. Türkiye.
- Schroeder, M., 2010, *Value and the wrong kind of reason*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Sorban, E.I., 2015, *A Pragmatic Examination of a Secular Age* (Unpublished Master's Thesis), Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada.
- Taha, P. & Davison, A., 2004, *Corporatist Ideology in Turkish State Ideology Türkiye*, Syracuse University Press, London.
- Taylor, C., 2007, *a Secular Age*. Retrieved on 2 July 2020 from https://www.academia.edu/11558528/Charles_Taylor_A_Secular_Age_2007.
- Topal, S., "Everybody Wants Secularism—But Which One? Contesting Definitions of Secularism in Contemporary Türkiye", *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 25(1): 1–14.
- Tüfekyapan, A.K., *CB Erdoğan'ın İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı Toplantısına Video Konferans ile Konuşması (President Erdoğan's speech the Islamic Cooperation Organisation in 2020)*. Accessed on 20 October 2020 from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxp0E-sUHns>.
- Watters, S., 2018, "Developments in AKP Policy toward Religion and Homogeneity", *German Law Journal*, 19(2): 351–374.
- Weber, M., 1946, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* Oxford University Press, New York.
- Williams, K., "Religious Worldviews and the Common School: The French Dilemma", *Journal of philosophy of education*, 41(4): 675–692.
- Yavuz H. & Özcan, N., 2007, "Crisis in Türkiye: The Conflict of Political Languages", *Middle East Policy*, 14: 118–135. 10.1111/j.1475-4967.2007.00317.x..
- Yavuz, H., *Islamic Political Identity in Türkiye*, 2003, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Yegen, M., 2007, "Citizenship and Ethnicity in Türkiye", *Middle Eastern Studies* 40(6): 51–66.
- Yılmaz, I., 2021, *Creating the Desired Citizen: Ideology, State and Islam in Türkiye*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Yılmaz, I., & Erturk, O.F., 2021, "Pro-Violence Sermons of a Secular State: Türkiye's Diyanet on Islamist Militarism, Jihadism and Glorification of Martyrdom", *Religions* 12: 659. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12080>.
- Zagzebski, L., "Exemplarist virtue theory", 2010, *Metaphilosophy*, 41(1): 41–57.
- Zavalsız, S., 2012, "Din Değiştirmenin Psiko-Sosyal Kodları, (The psychological and social codes of religious conversion)", *Çukurova Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 12 (2): 192.
- Zurcher, E.J., 2004, *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası ve siyasal muhafazakârlık. Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Muhafazakârlık, (Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic. The Progressive Republican Party)*, No pub., Leiden.

NOTES

1. Pantheism: the doctrine that the universe conceived of as a whole is God and, conversely, that there is no God but the combined substance, forces, and laws that are manifested in the existing universe (Brittanica).
2. The Turkish government has recently asked that the country be called by its Turkish name, a change which the United Nations has now adopted.
3. The official state ideology of Türkiye.
4. The term *ancien regime* has been adopted from Ahmet Kuru's article "Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles, and State Policies toward Religion".
5. Charismatic leader or authority is a concept of leadership developed by the German sociologist Max Weber. It involves a type of organization or a type of leadership in which authority derives from the charisma of the leader. This stands in contrast to two other types of authority: legal authority and traditional authority (Wikipedia). In the case of Türkiye, this leader is Atatürk.
6. According to system justification theory, people hold not only favorable attitudes about themselves, but also to the groups they belong to. This system also justifies an inferiority of low-status groups and a positive image of higher status groups. In the case of Türkiye, this SJB is Kemalism.
7. The Committee of Union and Progress was a revolutionary organization and political party active between 1889 and 1926 in the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey.
8. Young Turks (Turkish Jöntürkler): a coalition of various reform groups that led a revolutionary movement against the authoritarian regime of Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid II, which culminated in the establishment of a constitutional government. After their rise to power, the Young Turks introduced programs that promoted the modernization of the Ottoman Empire and a new spirit of Turkish nationalism.
9. The enchanted and disenchanting peripheries are terms acquired from Charles Taylor's book, *A Secular Age*. The enchanted refer to the conservative and devout population, while the disenchanting refer to those who lead a secular and modern way of life.
10. Although predominantly a Muslim country, during these years (called the period of February 28th Post-modern Coup) Türkiye was embroiled in political turmoil around the headscarf issue.
11. Abdülhamid II was the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire from 31 August 1876 to 27 April 1909, and the last sultan to exert effective control over the fracturing state. The period in which he reigned in the Ottoman Empire is known as the Hamidian Era.
12. Most of the founders of the Republic of Türkiye such as Atatürk, İnönü, Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, and Kazım Karabekir came from military backgrounds.
13. Despite the name, Young Turks included many Arabs, Albanians, Jews, and initially, Armenians and Greeks. To organize the opposition, progressive medical students and others formed a secret organization named the Committee of Ottoman Union (later Committee of Union and Progress – CUP), which grew in size and included exiles, civil servants, and army officers.
14. The Second Constitutional Era was the period of restored parliamentary rule in the Ottoman Empire between the 1908 Young Turk Revolution and the 1920 dissolution of the General Assembly, during the empire's twilight years.
15. Ottomanism was a concept that was created to attain social cohesion, an order based on nationality rather than race and religion.
16. A member of parliament during the single party regime of Atatürk.
17. Apart from some islands in the Aegean Sea, it is estimated that Türkiye lost 83 % of its land in Europe.

18. The Treaty of Sèvres was a 1920 treaty signed between the Allies of World War I and the Ottoman Empire. The treaty ceded large parts of Ottoman territory to France, the United Kingdom, Greece, and Italy, as well as creating large occupation zones within the Ottoman Empire.
19. “Large sections of its own society” refers to the conservative periphery.
20. <http://www.ozyazilim.com/ozgur/karikatur/cehennem.html>.
21. Bernard Lewis (31 May 1916 – 19 May 2018) was a British American historian specializing in oriental studies. Lewis was a Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University. Lewis’ expertise was in the history of Islam and the interaction between Islam and the West.
22. The Otoman Empire.
23. LAST is the acronym for Laic, Atatürkist, Sunni, and Turk as defined by Prof. Ihsan Yılmaz in his book called *Creating the Desired Citizen*. Here the secular-Sunni Turk who is Kemalist is preferred as the desired citizen.
24. In this march, it states “in 10 years we created 10 million young people of every age”, which is indicative of the policy of social engineering.
25. Şevki Yılmaz, 22/08/2013, Yeni Akit newspaper, *Haydi imam hatipe (Let’s Go to Imam Hatip Schools)*.
26. While this book was published as the official historical doctrine of the Turkish state ideology regime, it carries valuable insight into the regime’s religious standing. This book will be identified as Inan et. al, 1930 from hereon.
27. The *History 1* school textbook was written, published, and taught in public schools in less than a year after *The Fundamentals of Turkish History* was published in 1930.
28. The *History 1* and *History 2* books were taught in public schools between 1931–1941.
29. Turkish Encyclopedia of Islam.
30. Q. 53:4.
31. Inan et al., “The Fundamentals of Turkish History” (1930).
32. Waḥy is the Arabic word for revelation. In Islamic belief, revelation is God’s Word delivered through his chosen individuals – known as Messenger prophets – to mankind.
33. *History 1 for High School*.
34. This book will be referred to as (Medeni Bilgiler 1931) from now on.
35. Atatürk, “Medeni Bilgiler”, 43.
36. Atatürk, “Medeni Bilgiler”, 238.
37. Atatürk, “Medeni Bilgiler”, 80–81.
38. Atatürk, “Medeni Bilgiler”, 80–81.
39. <https://www.umass.edu/rso/spirals/Site/Paganism>.
40. *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*, Devre 4, Inikat 11, Sayfa 77.
41. Originally written in 1772 by the French philosopher Baron d’Holbach, it was translated into Turkish in 1924 by Abdullah Cevdet. In 1928, the book was reprinted in the new Turkish alphabet added to the national education curriculum list of books.
42. Atatürk, “Medeni Bilgiler”, 264.
43. *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*, Devre 4, Inikat 11, Sayfa 77.
44. <https://tarhibilgi.org/laiklik-nedir>.
45. Here, Böckenforde is referring to a society of a passive version of secularism, where he argues that if that society carries more religious symbols, then the more secular it is.
46. Charles Taylor is a renowned Canadian philosopher whose most significant contribution in the field of secularism is his book *A Secular Age*. This book argues against the secularization thesis of Max Weber, and

Steve Bruce. Taylor argues that secularization holds as long as modernity progresses, which will gradually diminish the influence of religion.

47. According to the University of Louisiana at Lafayette, natural law refers to those laws that derive their legitimacy from moral reasoning and are based on what is believed to serve the best interests of the common good while positive laws are those that obtain their legitimacy through legislative means and are enforced by civil or political authority. See <https://www.reference.com/world-view/difference-between-natural-law-positive-law-8f2dcoc93c1f95o8>.

48. On 18 April 2013 a more passive definition was given to secularism by the Turkish Constitutional Court under act 2012/128.