INSTITUTIONALIZED ISLAMOPHOBIA BEFORE PREVENT

Muslim Students, Campus Watch and the ‘Fundamentalist’ Formation in British Universities

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Across the breadth of literature addressing the implementation of the CTSA (Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015) in British universities, Counter-Terror state measures are often articulated as interrupting the liberal egalitarianism of universities, sites held to maintain equality principles. I argue that this body of critique unwittingly submerges the historically racialized character of universities and in particular, the sector’s own production of a transgressive ‘Muslim student subject’. Grounded in empirical research and historical document analysis, I address this lacuna by highlighting how one aspect of Islamophobic discourse in the sector, centering on the figure of the ‘fundamentalist’ has previously been institutionalized and harnessed to Islamophobic effect. This aspect of Muslim student histories in Higher Education is identified as a formative period cohering with prevailing narratives of securitisation and surveillance, whereby ‘Prevent’ can be seen to merge into an existing institutional regime of racialized ‘post’-disciplinary power.

With little exception, across the breadth of scholarly literature addressing the implementation of the ‘Prevent Duty’ (CTSA 2015) in British universities, a distinct narrative predominates; whereby the imposition of Counter-Terror state measures is viewed as interrupting the liberal egalitarianism of universities, sites deemed to be free of racialized regulation. I argue that this body of critique unwittingly submerges the historically racialized character of universities and in particular, the sector’s own production of the ‘transgressive fundamentalist Muslim student subject.’

Grounded in empirical research (2004–5) and historical/document analysis of the nineties, I address this lacuna by charting a series of junctures which illuminate how one aspect of Islamophobic discourse in the sector, centering on the figure of the ‘fundamentalist’ has previously been institutionalized and harnessed to Islamophobic effect. I elucidate how this aspect of Muslim student histories can be identified as marking a formative period that cohere with prevailing narratives of securitization and surveillance.
Framed through a decolonial perspective, it is argued that dominant characterisations of state imposition in the sector do not represent a radical disjuncture from (pre-)existing discourses associated with ‘Muslim students’. Rather, in troubling the neo-liberal university as a-priori racialized, it is argued that Prevent has (e)merged into an existing regime of racialized ‘post’-disciplinary power.

PREVENT (CTSA 2015) AND THE ABSENCE OF THE UNIVERSITY

We have tarnished and problematized the Muslim student community, as a specific issue, and we are not now honest enough to admit we have all been complicit in that targeting and vilification.¹

The CTSA (Counter Terror and Security Act 2015), widely known as the ‘Prevent Duty’ has invited considerable political and academic critique in Higher Education.² The Act mandates specified authorities, including universities, to have “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.”³ Underlining some of this critique is the ways its judicial powers,⁴ institutionalize and entrench a racialized perspective of Muslim students with (potentially) racist consequences; unnecessarily compromising the liberal egalitarianism of the university and the integrity of pedagogical relationships.⁵ It may therefore come as a surprise that the interviewee excerpt above, expressed a decade prior to the introduction of the CTSA, invokes sector culpability in the stigmatization of Muslim students. In recounting such observations, I allude to a history of institutionalized Islamophobia in HE that appears to have been eclipsed in critiques of statutory guidance. It is this earlier and arguably, formative context with which this article is concerned.

In HE, ‘Muslim students’ have long been corralled to discourses of ‘extremism.’ The profiling of British ‘educated’ ‘middle class’ Muslim networks and their susceptibility to extremism in universities, has an established history in governmental output.⁶ Traceable to at least the early nineties,⁷ the covert focus on Muslim students in Prevent’s classified period (2003–2006)⁸ later sharpened in political discourse following the July bombings.⁹ Hereon in the links between ‘extremist Muslim activity’ and universities as ‘ungoverned spaces’ become overtly promulgated;¹⁰ with other notable cases,¹¹ catalyzing formalized recommendations in the sector.¹² Whilst this established focus on ‘Muslim students’ and alleged clandestine activities have not been matched with a credible evidence base,¹³ the progressive psycho-pathologization of ‘Muslim’ students¹⁴ has found concrete expression in Prevent ‘Duty’ guidance which leaves “no body or institution risk free.”¹⁵ This statutory focus and the disciplinary regime it engenders has, in turn, become the primary academic and political lens through which the curtailment of Muslim political expression in British universities is articulated, registered and critiqued.¹⁶ However, the pre-dominance of the ‘Duty’ in accounts of Muslim student experiences weigh so heavily as to have erased the broader racialized historical and institutional context within which Prevent has (e)merged.

This is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in the CVCP report, Extremism and Intolerance;¹⁷ university guidance between 1998–2005 that focused on ‘Muslim’ extremism in ways not too dissimilar from Prevent. UUK cited the report to the Home Office, as one of
many examples of “good practice” in the management of ‘radicalisation.’ That these histories are flagged in the context of Prevent’s expansive judicial reach, yet pass unremarked, convey the lack of scrutiny the sector enjoys, even as it flaunts its own troubling historical record on Muslim students.

Herein lies a key contention; that across the range of critiques of the ‘Prevent Duty,’ the university/sector remains largely untroubled, even absent, as a site which has formed a key locus in (re)producing the institutionalization of racism vis Muslim students. With little exception, critiques remain centered on state encroachment into an otherwise ‘safe campus.’ Consequently, the site of the White (neo)liberal university remains intact offering little semblance of (a history of) a racialized campus.

Hence, this contribution seeks to foreground the site of the university (including management bodies and student unions) within a much broader trajectory of institutionalized Islamophobia than currently emerges. Charting a period between the early nineties to the incipient stages of Prevent (2003–2005), it is argued that this period was decisive in institutionalizing aspects of anti-Muslim racism in HE which flourished in the absence of relevant equality infrastructures. This focuses on the way the projection of a hyper-visible Muslim student ‘presence,’ through ‘fundamentalist’ narratives, invariably rendered Muslim student engagements on campus as distinctly disruptive, troublesome and outside the bounds of legitimate discourse; incurring greater scrutiny, regulation and repression.

In what follows, I offer a brief outline of the analytical background to this research. I introduce the Prevent agenda in HE, and drawing on Prevent literature, make two key observations. First, that prior racialized histories pertaining to Muslim students remain distinctly absent and second, in view of the breadth of literature to the contrary, the collective impression left by such accounts reify HEI’s as sites of inclusivity and equality. The significance of these observations becomes clearer as I outline the transgressive status accorded to Muslim students in the sector.

In the second part, I surmise the way current literature has accounted for the ‘no-platforming’ of Muslim groups in the nineties and the surrounding Islamophobic discourse it further inspired. I then attend to a series of junctures; student campaigns (Campus Watch, 1996), NUS Conferences (NUS 1995), ‘Anti-Racist’ guidebooks (A Light Sleeper, 1999) and University guidance (CVCP 1998); these are revisited and to some degree, read against the prevailing securitized context. It is argued that these successive interventions illuminate how one key aspect of Islamophobic discourse in the sector, centering around the figure of the ‘fundamentalist,’ have previously been institutionalized with Islamophobic effect. Ultimately cohering, rather than conflicting with Prevent apparatus.

**ANALYTICAL GROUNDING; RACIALIZED GOVERNMENTALITY, ‘FUNDAMENTALISM’ AND ISLAMOPHOBIA**

This analytical contribution forms part of a broader study that focused on the racialized dynamics that emerged when Muslim students attempted to engage with their respective institutions; including unions, spanning a period between 2004–2008. For the purposes of this article, I draw upon a selection of interviews with (former) Muslim students, NUS
(National Union of Students) activists and others as well as (un)published reports, academic critiques, and media archives of the period.24

Interviewees and institutions are accorded pseudonyms. There are no proclamations on ‘ethnic’ affinities and ‘insider’ status; decolonial reflexive methodologies are explored elsewhere.25 Grounded in a broadly decolonial framework, the disciplinary regulation of Muslim students through discourses of ‘fundamentalism’ and its cognates is posited as an exercise in racialized governmentality.26

Racialized governmentality refers to the discipline, management and (self-)regulation of racialized populations, in this case, non-Europeized populations within White ‘post’-colonial’ states. As a form of ‘White’ disciplinary power, it has been identified as symptomatic of the decolonial.27 Institutionalized Islamophobia is located as an expression of racialized governmentality centered upon containing Muslim agency and can be discerned in the fabric of liberal democracies across a number of (non-)state, institutional and discursive registers.

‘Fundamentalist’ ascriptions have long been documented as a central plank in Islamophobia often delineated by masculine authoritarianism, a propensity to violence, and infiltration. This is particularly relevant to Higher Education where racist ascriptions of ‘fundamentalism/extremism’ have loomed large and repeatedly functioned to delegitimize and (self-)regulate Muslim student interventions, although not without contestation. Significantly, this includes activity within student unions, which prior to 2005, had rarely been the subject of scrutiny on questions of ‘race’ or equality legislation.32

**PREVENT CRITIQUES AND THE RACIALIZED UNIVERSITY**

The Prevent Duty represents the culmination of over a decade of governmental counter terrorist interventions in the UK.33 Over the course, it has rendered Muslim communities a ‘self-policing’ “suspect population”35 and in its most far-reaching revisions (CTSA 2015) sought to permeate British institutions.

We can observe somewhat parallel developments in the lifecycle of Prevent in universities.36 In its early years, the de facto infrastructure for Prevent very quickly extended to various sites of the university.37 Whilst these interventions raised comparatively little attention, it is the statutory imposition understood to be laid out in Guidance that, at least initially, incurred most pushback from students academics and within academic inquiry itself.

The body of academic literature critiquing the impact, implementation and implications of the Prevent Duty in universities has been wide-ranging as it has been robust, with its fallout in view of Muslim Students appearing as a central and somewhat tangential concern.33 However, of the key strands of the ‘Duty’ that emerge as notably inhibiting for Muslim students; stringent regulations pertaining to external speakers/events, and the racist outcomes the ‘Duty’ poses, particularly with regard to curbing ‘free speech’, they are not entirely novel in the history of Muslim student activism in British universities. In research on Muslim students predating the mainstreaming of the PVE program, event regulation, (micro-)surveillance, ‘fundamentalist-extremist’ stigma, and censorship figure
stridently on British campuses. These themes can also be found in research conducted prior to the Duty.

The most dominant way Prevent has been articulated in view of universities is through a neoliberal impulse to monitor, regulate and survey. This often highlights the notable ease with which Prevent has been absorbed into the sector and the panoply of existing regulations upon which Prevent has been transposed. Bauman et al. highlight institutional complicity through a more holistic lens, unpacking the troubled status of Muslims/Islam in the post-colonial neoliberal university. Whilst these aforementioned contributions are cognizant of governmental-institutional confluence, what is less apparent is that the ‘prime suspect’ central to the ‘Duty’ also has a distinctly visible trajectory within HE marked by a transgressive Muslim hyper-visibility that is, ubiquitously registered as ‘fundamentalist-cum-extremist.’

Hence, the (pre-)“existing prism” through which Muslim students have been projected in the campus imaginary as a threat to be regulated is virtually absent, remaining sutured to a post 7/7 chronology. This is illuminated in the way critiques of Prevent in local Muslim communities appear comparably anchored and contextualized within prior histories of racialized problematization and criminalization. It is perhaps not insignificant that the sharpest critique of the sector stems from the Muslim student community in Islamophobia literature, within a historical framing preceding Prevent.

Whilst there are a number of explanations for this sector disparity, this relative silence means little is drawn from the last two decades of research on racism in the sector broadly, or specifically in view of Muslim students. Indeed, it is noteworthy that ‘Prevent’ has been inserted into a sector which is yet to come to terms with a post-Macpherson historical legacy that renders Muslim students absent as victims of racism; instead, beleaguered by a legacy of perpetration. This has not been overcome in any substantive way with the introduction of the Equality Directive (2010) which identifies religion and belief as a ‘protected characteristic.’ As some have suggested, the ‘Duty’ appears to have superseded the Equality Directive even merging both ‘duties’ (infra)structurally. This institutional deficit, together with disciplinary institutional histories fall under the radar in securitized accounts which overlook the site of imposition in sustaining racialized forms of governance.

THE LIBERAL MYTH IN DECOLONIAL PERSPECTIVE

In addition to this institutional oversight, many critiques of the ‘Duty’ unwittingly sustain the myth of the neoliberal university. This framing can be seen to uphold a post-enlightenment liberality associated with inclusivity and a ‘post-racial’ meritocracy considered inherent to processes of neoliberalization. Hence, there is a distinct characterization that the university is being imposed upon by the state to implement racist policies in contravention of its own equality commitments. Hence, the Prevent logic is identified as “profoundly racialized” in which Muslim students are “compelled…to perform non-extremism,” yet there is a taken for granted- ness of the various “codes of practice that universities themselves have in place to counter discrimination and inequality.” This example explicates what is often left absent or paled from view. Whilst these remain vital critiques of Prevent, particularly in view of
its reported detrimental impact,\textsuperscript{70} the state arguably becomes \emph{overstated} in highlighting the racialization of Muslims in universities.

From a decolonial perspective, the university is a-priori racialized and no less marked by incomplete processes of decolonisation.\textsuperscript{71} This is not because of a post-war educational expansion reflecting a ‘black’ student intake but because the very foundations of modern western universities “remain unshakably colonial,”\textsuperscript{72} molded like the “racial state” of which they are a part, in the image of Whiteness.\textsuperscript{73} This institutional whiteness continues to gaze upon ‘Others,’ even as they stare right back.\textsuperscript{74}

How the condition of coloniality\textsuperscript{75} assumes recognizable forms in the White neoliberal university can be detected in ‘post-colonial’ racial regulatory ‘codes.’ Operating in the subtext of ‘liberal’ discourses, they “subsist fraudulently”\textsuperscript{976} to be found in liberal\textsuperscript{77} anti-racist, multiculturalist\textsuperscript{78} secularist\textsuperscript{79} ‘diversity’\textsuperscript{80} and ‘race relations’ paradigms.\textsuperscript{81} It is within the ‘normative grammar of race’\textsuperscript{82} to which the latter are anchored that Muslims assume a ‘transruptive’\textsuperscript{83} and ‘tolerated’ status. Interrupting a Eurocentric hegemonic racial order, by virtue of their Muslimness, Muslims figure as an excessive collectivity in contravention of liberal precepts.\textsuperscript{84}

How this ‘normative grammar’ affects the status and management of Muslim students is manifest in various ways, not least in the spatial, sartorial and political regulation their presence elicit.\textsuperscript{85} Indeed, Muslim students have traditionally been perceived as beneficiaries of an excessive ‘multiculturalism,’ transgressing the (secular) liberality of the university.\textsuperscript{86} This particular cultural configuration has shown little evidence of eroding.\textsuperscript{87} Rather, in the prevailing CT context, Muslim students do not just figure as a threat and ‘problem to be managed’ but within the racialized neoliberal campus, as resource and fantasy to be regulated,\textsuperscript{88} exposing the limits of the liberal academy.\textsuperscript{89}

**A FUNDAMENTALIST PRESENCE**

In 1999, an article in the Muslim News lamented that “Muslims were [only] presented as the agents of racist violence rather than its victims.”\textsuperscript{90} These observations point to the “amplification”\textsuperscript{91} of racialized groups within ‘white’ ‘post-colonial’ societies. In view of Muslims, this hyper-visibility has emerged most forcefully in the shape of the ‘fundamentalist–extremist’ amalgam that has continued to evolve and morph across key political junctures. Forming a deeply entrenched hegemonic “populist racist ascription,”\textsuperscript{92} this ascription has been key to explaining ‘away’ Muslim political behavior\textsuperscript{93} but also central to the regulation and repression of Muslim political identities through “moral panics which inform the limitations [on Muslim] spatial mobility...political participation and social visibility.”\textsuperscript{94}

Emerging from within a discourse of the black ‘folk devil’ associated with “muggers” and “rioters” of the seventies, the projection of a violent masculine ‘fundamentalist folk devil’ was intimated with the \textit{Satanic Verses} affair and later, the 1995 Bradford riots.\textsuperscript{95} However, unlike the dominant depictions of an illiterate working-class Muslim clergy,\textsuperscript{96} or the ‘fundamentalism’ of a Brasian criminal underclass\textsuperscript{97} claims of a widespread Muslim fundamentalist presence on campuses were bound up in a somewhat different Muslim
‘subject’; an educated cadre of young Muslim men preaching an ‘intellectual’ Islamic revivalism on British campuses. Projected as a ‘mass’ presence, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) came to epitomize an endemic ‘fundamentalist’ threat, publicized for courting controversy, distributing anti-Semitic literature and homophobic slurs, which in their early days, they did little to diffuse. Whilst there appears to be consensus that HT comprised a ‘fringe’ group and ‘little known’ numerically, the scale of their activity in the nineties is subject to greater contestation. Between the self-aggrandizement of party leaders, campaigns instigated by the NUS and media sensationalism, figures in this early period have never been established. However, what is of greater interest within the scope of this contribution is not whether, but how their presence was being iterated and substantiated, and then extended to legislate Muslim student political activity.

Indeed, throughout the nineties, ‘knowledge’ of a Muslim ‘fundamentalist’ presence in British universities became institutionalized with little scrutiny. The subject of intensive political campaigning in the NUS, and to a lesser degree Teacher Union and LGBT groups, a succession of NUS ‘liberation’ motions seeking to ban HT included those submitted in 1994, 1995, and 2004, leading to a blanket NUS ban.

In retrospect, these staggering NUS campaigns have oft been given scant mention or cited unproblematically in the current securitized context. Seen as a self-evident response to the problem of ‘fundamentalism’, ‘no-platforming’ is maintained within a university ‘duty of care’ against the securitizing effects of the ‘Duty.’ In other places, the emergence of nineties ‘Islamist’ groups on campus are folded within prevailing trajectories of ‘radicalisation.’ In more poetic ethnographies of pro-Israeli advocacy on campus, this period is overlooked altogether; although formulated with the greatest momentum from the NUS-UJS (Union of Jewish Students). The concerted NUS drive to ‘no-platform’ HT has also been misconstrued as the outcome of governmental proscription. Paradoxically, what is over-written and obfuscated in this period is the enactment of Islamophobia itself.

Whilst the NUS attributed the “rise in racial tension” on campuses to the active presence of Hizb ut-Tahrir, who have been widely cited for their anti-Semitic propaganda, there is little sense that these campaigns also succeeded in racializing campuses in other ways; conflating a range of Muslim political expression within a ‘fundamentalist’ extremist assemblage, whilst failing to recognize Muslims as ‘victims’ of racism.

I argue that these high-profile NUS ‘no-platform’ campaigns, the Campus Watch initiative and NUS ‘anti-racist’ handbook, merge epistemologically; each bearing a striking resemblance and shaping a dynamic of racialized hypervisibility. Across these junctures, Muslim students were characteristically absent as victims of racism; their presence as political actors became conflated with highly ambiguous and questionable conceptions of ‘fundamentalist-extremism’ (also implied in their absence as victims); in turn functioning as a basis to inhibit and regulate political activity. The culmination of this can be seen in university guidance (CVCP 1998). Drawing on a range of literature, each of these junctures are elaborated below.
Established by the Union of Jewish Students (UJS),112 NUS and Searchlight113 in 1994, Campus Watch was established as a nation-wide ‘hotline’ for victims of racist hate-crime on British campuses.114 Although reported to have emerged in response to far-right groups such as the BNP,115 the initiative coincided with HT activity highly antagonistic to Israel and Jews.116 In response, the (JBD) Jewish Board of Deputies, along with the UJS and local politicians sought to have them proscribed and the 1994 NUS conference committed to “combat the party’s activities on campuses.”117

Between 15 October 1994 and 15 October 1995, the helpline reported to have received 381 calls, of which 271 related to ‘Islamic Extremist Groups.’ Of these groups, HT was reported to account for the bulk of complaints.118 However, concerns about the veracity of Campus Watch were raised within Muslim media and later in academic sources. Q-news for example noted that the “hotline” was making far-reaching claims “based on anecdotal reports,”119 and academic research observed that claims of fundamentalism were not grounded in “empirically reliable research” but driven by the “lobbying activities” of students.120

Upon closer examination, Campus Watch reportage did raise a number of questions around categories of offence, transparency and the ends to which ‘data’ was being wielded. For whilst media reports attributed over 70% of total ‘extremist’ attacks to HT, how victims identified their perpetrators as such, as opposed to other ‘Muslim’ groups/individuals, was never clarified or openly documented.

Between reported figures, approximately 43 offences (15%), in the ‘Islamic Extremist’ category fail to be clearly attributed to any named group, with the exception of one article, that identifies the Nation of Islam (NOI). What is interesting about the markers to delineate these groups are the phenotypical distinctions they rely on; in comparison with the ‘African Caribbean’ Nation of Islam (NOI), HT are identified as predominantly ‘Asian.’121 However, if the primary means of identifying HT rested on their visibly ‘Asian’ appearance,122 an issue also aired at the 1995 NUS conference, this raised further questions about the arbitrary inclusion of Muslim students more widely and their purported involvement in the listed categories of offence.

‘Hate’ crimes123 committed by HT were documented to include more than 100 instances of offensive literature, 50 offensive meetings, 47 threats of violence and 31 acts of physical intimidation or harassment.124 Whilst inflammatory ‘Hizb’ material has been documented across research,125 although not without difficulty,126 it is not clear what ‘meetings’ entailed, to whom they were considered offensive and the basis upon which they were logged as offensive. Based on academic research and media coverage during this period, these most likely related to Israel,127 also reflected in a HT declaration which sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to clarify their position on Jews and Israel.128

Meetings on Israel recounted in this period often invited broader interest and disciplinary measures curtailing freedom of speech129 which inevitably affected a wider cohort of (Muslim) students.130 This was also evidenced in the way NUS campaigns had begun to subsume within them a range of Muslim student political activity, including solidarity with Palestinians and Bosnians.131 At the time, this was becoming a source of grievance amongst Muslim students132 suggesting the ‘problem’ was not circumscribed by the unsavory activities of
fringe groups, but perhaps more pertinent to the growing politicization of Muslim students and a Muslim consciousness, at a time when Muslims globally and locally were being demonized as Other amidst a series of international concerns.

On campuses, Muslim students were feared to influence opinion on the Palestinian Question. Research conducted in the aftermath of these campaigns also related the way pro-Palestinian meetings, the presence of ISOC stalls in close proximity to JSOC at fresher fayres, and motions supporting Palestinian rights were construed as inherently offensive and anti-Semitic. This raises questions as to whether Campus Watch was hastily conflating legitimate expressions of resistance to Israel with ‘extremist’ behavior. This remains a valid and enduring question, not least, because subsequent anti-racist guidance produced by the NUS in 1999 maintained similar conflations. Herein, ‘fundamentalist’ stigma was generously applied to critics of Israel. One way this was achieved was by listing anti-Zionism as a form of racism. Collapsing the distinction between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism clearly lent itself to stigmatizing all critique as ‘extremist’ and ‘anti-Semitic.’ This has historically formed a significant point of contention, but also in anti-racist student struggles, serving to propel Islamophobic discourse. This elision was not peculiar to the handbook, and explicit in NUS’s broader stance.

Finally, central to claims about HT was their role in (inciting) violence. This remained an extant feature of campaigns and was widely reported against certain constituencies, (Jews, Gays and others). However, in view of prevailing literature, charges of violence remain incongruous with academic research closely tracing the evolution of HT as a non-violent ideological movement. Whilst certainly provocative in their vociferous critiques of Muslim regimes, Israel, homosexuality, and ‘apathetic’ Muslims and inviting counter-protest in good measure their association with physical violence, on or off campus, is difficult to maintain, and perhaps better attributed to later splinter groups.

However, in spite of questions around a substantive empirical-base, Campus Watch nonetheless continued to provide succor to NUS ‘liberation’ campaigns and to a lesser degree, teacher unions. In this period, charges of Muslim student ‘fundamentalism’ reached a notable pitch, providing the basis for Home Office action to ban HT. The project also received public authorization by consecutive NUS presidencies. In 1995, NUS president Jim Murphy remarked that “Hizb al-Tahrir was the biggest single extremist threat at the moment.” He went on to claim of this putative ‘fact’;

the college authorities know it, the police know it, and it is astonishing that Michael Howard, the Home Secretary, is doing nothing about it.

In 1996, NUS president Douglas Trainer, praised Campus Watch as a “massively important project” recounting the hundreds of calls it had attracted. Whilst Socialist critiques observed that NUS anti-racist campaigns had “done nothing to lessen anti-Muslim prejudice,” Trainer dismissed this as unrepresentative of student views. Instead, he asserted that “the real situation on campus has been well documented by the THES and by other national media.”

The ‘real situation’ as it was being projected however, appeared to be grounded in circuitous iterations. For contrary to verifying the basis of such claims, Trainer underscored
the way media reportage provided sufficient authentication for his claims. Fortified with every subsequent reference, claims of ‘Muslim Fundamentalism’ had become self-referential; mirrored between student leadership, media commentators and the Home Office, alongside a panoply of literature dedicated to the ‘fundamentalist problem.’ Such ‘testimony’ reflected the production of a body of knowledge about ‘Muslim student fundamentalism’ and how its circulation formed an internally consistent and pervasive “hegemonic formation,” stabilized through repetition and the occlusion of ‘Other’ forms of knowledge.

Indeed, skepticism associated with the report went unnoticed as did the muted recognition that HT’s profile was being raised not by virtue of their own merit or standing, but the generous publicity and campaigning devoted to them. The efficacy of this body of ‘knowledge’ was evidenced in the way its claims quickly suffused the sector, providing the evidence-base within NUS liberation campaigns and eventually finding its way into university guidance.

**NUS CONFERENCE 1995; ‘ANTI-RACIST’ POLITICS AND THE ABSENCE OF MUSLIMS**

During the *Campus Watch* initiative, the 1995 NUS conference was a turning point. Although preceded by earlier commitments, Tyrer recalls that, “never before had the presence of Muslim students in the traditionally elite domain of British higher education been so openly debated.” The debate, he argued was formulated as “an alleged threat to the academy and to non-Muslims posed by the specter of Islamic ‘fundamentalism.’” This was a hostile environment in which Muslim visibility had become aligned with clandestine agendas.

However, this consistent focus on HT within NUS anti-racist campaigning appeared to be distinctly skewed in multiple ways, not least against the electoral gains of the BNP at the time. Aware of the vastly different power differentials at play, the Socialist Workers Students Party (SWSS) argued that “to equate a tiny group like Hizb ut-Tahrir with the BNP who have polling up to 44% in local elections is a disgrace.” In this context, it seemed peculiar that the NUS appeared less perturbed by the mainstreaming of White right-wing racism in the establishment, instead selecting to invest considerable resources on a ‘fringe’ group that many (Muslim) students did not take seriously.

In my interview with one NUS executive official cognizant of this disparity in NUS ‘anti’ racist campaigning, he echoed similar sentiments:

> from listening to NUS historically you would have got the impression that the main racist threat on campus is not the BNP, far right groups, institutional racism but actually a small marginal Islamic group such as HT and AM. That’s what’s been portrayed.

Having spent considerable time working in unions at local/national levels in the late nineties, he was of the view that the NUS “anti-racism campaign has been one...mechanism that has totally marginalized and acted against the interests of the people we should be defending.’ He raised concerns that Muslim students were persistently portrayed as “uniquely reactionary on various social questions’ and as “chief perpetrators’ of racist violence.”
This racialized configuration was evidenced in the early conflations between Muslim students and alleged ‘fundamentalist’ conduct. At the time, the SWP (Socialist Workers Party) claimed that HT “were being used as a stick to beat all Muslims,” echoing the ‘fundamentalist’ litmus tests that had ensued post-Rushdie, to which universities were not impervious. It was argued that the 1995 conference had seen the arbitrary branding of all Muslims as “stupid, backward and ignorant” with “indiscriminate allegations of Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ levelled against visibly ethicized delegates.” As alluded to in concerns about Campus Watch, the inability, or rather unwillingness to distinguish between Muslim constituencies was explicit in NUS literature. Reflecting this broad-brush approach, the NUS argued,

the Hizb in Britain...are a relatively small, organization. This is largely because of the small Muslim population in this country.

This at once inferred HT’s fringe status, yet maintained ‘fundamentalism’ as inherent to Britain’s Muslim population. Within the terms of these NUS interventions, more Muslims equated greater ‘fundamentalist’ problems. Somewhat perversely, whilst such campaigns claimed to fervently protect the multicultural campus against (‘fundamentalist’) racists, Muslim students did not figure in the range of ‘oppressed’ groups listed. Muslim students were no doubt the central focus of HT's attention and harassment, yet the NUS included every identifiable ‘oppressed group’ in their literature, except Muslims. Motion 116, for example, stated,

Hizb ut-Tahrir preaches the death of Jews, Hindus, Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals and has verbally and physically harassed Jewish students and has, on a number of occasions, affected the welfare of Jewish students.

This notable absence stood in stark contrast to the NUS Presidents response to critiques of Islamophobia, that Muslim students were the ‘loudest’ bearers of complaints (in Campus Watch) and were being defended in NUS campaigns. However, this retort did not accord with the NUS’s ‘anti-racist’ strategy, nor translate into meaningful action in which Muslim students were recognized as victims of (racist) affronts, extremist or otherwise.

In this context, Muslim students were reporting suppression, yet the NUS were said to be “failing to mention” such instances, instead favoring other ‘liberation’ campaigns relating to women and sexuality. This particular composition of ‘anti-fascist’ solidarity within the student movement was echoed in broader circles cognizant of the way racism against ‘Black’ communities was being neglected. This also featured in claims against Searchlight, the anti-racist magazine supporting the NUS. Evidently, the progressivism of the NUS was no less bound up in Eurocentric conceptions of racism. This presented a curious racialized inversion. For although Muslim students formed the primary targets of HT propaganda and NUS campaigns, they recede from view; except as ‘fundamentalist’ actors.

Such racialized asymmetries in campus politics reflected the priorities of the factions steering the NUS agenda. Those who disagreed with this approach were removed from NUS executive. Upheld by the historic alliance between Labour-UJS, this characterized NUS
(anti-)racist politics and their campaigning against fringe Islamic groups for the proceeding decade. This period reflected the lack of an organized Muslim presence at national level, and the marginalization of the Black Students Movement, features which shifted considerably by the time of research (2004–2006).

**A FUNDAMENTALIST FALLOUT**

Academic literature has acknowledged the immediate ‘backlash’ ‘ordinary Muslims’ suffered as a result of HT activity; such as prayer rooms being closed down or Islamic societies being banned. However, the fallout from NUS campaigns can be observed more widely, notably in the way pre-emptive readings of Muslim political activity would inspire narratives of ‘fundamentalist coups’ or infiltration, yet actually relate to more mundane union positions, or anti-racist protest. For example, in 1995, President of University of North London Students Union, Imran Choudhry, found himself at the center of NUS and media furore when along with five other Muslim students, he was elected on to the union executive. He was accused of being involved in a ‘fundamentalist’ coup; although these charges quickly dissipated when it emerged, he had little political inclination and had stood for ‘sports representative.’

Similarly, in October 1995, it was reported that London Guildhall University was closing amidst fears of a ‘fundamentalist’ attack when HT were thought to be involved in demonstrations nearby. According to the NUS, this verified the dangers posed by HT. However, other media reportage indicated that demonstrators were not intent on threatening university staff or students, but were apparently protesting a racist attack involving a ‘young Asian woman’ by a member of the Rugby Club. There was reportedly ‘no organized presence’ of HT at this university; nonetheless, claims of a “300-strong demonstration by the group” was construed as a ‘fundamentalist’ presence.

This type of ‘Muslim- handling’ persisted. “Viewed with suspicion and mistrust” wrote Jenny Bristow, a Socialist student at Sussex University in 1996, “Muslim students attempting to set up union societies are often presumed to have a connection with Hizb ut-Tahrir, and find their activities closely monitored.” Scaremongering about Black and Asian students in unions had become increasingly commonplace, as was the slippage between those identified as ‘Muslim’ and ‘fundamentalist.’

Similarly, according to research in the late nineties, “the most mundane of contacts with the union would be scrutinized by union staff convinced that the society was a haven for fundamentalists” or in the context of research in 2004–2005, Muslim student activity was often curbed and delegitimized on spurious claims of ‘militant’ activity, fraudulence and the threat of ‘Islamist bloc’ power. These were not isolated incidents but reflect an enduring and dominant pattern of reading the organized presence and interventions of Muslim students; as an incursion and violation of an otherwise harmonious multicultural campus. Parallels with the insidious effects of Prevent are discernible. For whilst not of the same gravity and consequence, or necessarily directly stifling formal political interventions, it is arguably the case that ‘Muslim students’ comprised a hyper-visibilized ‘suspect’ presence in the sector, before they were ‘securitized’ as suspect. Thus, we can observe similarities (and distinctions) between the ‘fundamentalist’ moral panics of the nineties and the securitized
politics of the war on terror\textsuperscript{193} invoking the ‘affirmed’ threat of the Muslim Other as a ‘common sense’ problem to be acted upon.

**MIRRORING THE ABSENCE OF MUSLIMS; THE CVCP REPORT AND A LIGHT SLEEPER**

*Campus Watch* and NUS ‘liberation’ campaigns during this period can be seen as key in sustaining the moral panics about ‘Muslim student fundamentalism.’ These were to inform the ‘CVCP’ report, *Extremism and Intolerance on Campus (1998)*; sector guidelines in response to the alleged “experience of extremism and intolerance of various kinds on...campuses in recent years.”\textsuperscript{194} The codes of conduct enshrined in the report were being formulated with the NUS as early as March 1996, seeking to ban ‘extremists’ from standing for full-time representative posts in student unions.\textsuperscript{195} However, in spite of claims that “the code would not target any one group, but extremism more generally”\textsuperscript{196} the report failed to fulfil this (pre)cursory claim as it became apparent that the ‘various kinds’ of extremism to which the report referred were of the Muslim kind.

Following the CVCP report, in 1999, the NUS and UJS jointly published *Racism; A Light Sleeper*, an anti-Racist handbook for students. Introduced by the NUS president, he asserted that “the threat from Islamic extremist organisation continues to bring fear to many campuses.”\textsuperscript{197} The entrenched patterns of racialized hyper-visibility threaded through both the report and handbook are further discussed below.

The CVCP report employed several exemplars of ‘extremism’ which functioned as a substitute for a clear definition of extremism. These exemplars related to incidences either involving Muslim students or regarding claims circulated about Muslim students.\textsuperscript{198} However the basis for these exemplars were thrown into question, for although being referenced as “generic examples of conduct,”\textsuperscript{199} they appeared to coincide with a range of unsubstantiated allegations of Muslim perpetrated hate-crimes circulating at the time.\textsuperscript{200} Of particular concern, was that models of extremism implied that Muslims comprised the chief perpetrators (not victims) of racist violence.

It is salient that the report located itself within existing legislation (Part 3 of the Public Order Act) which did not afford protection to Muslims as Muslims. Naturally, it replicated these omissions in its exemplars of extremism (e.g., distribution of racist leaflets). Hence, whilst the exemplars of ‘extremist’ behavior focused on ‘Muslim’ perpetrators, victims were defined in exclusively ‘racial/ethnic’ terms. This produced a blind spot. Whilst Jewish and Sikh students were to fit comfortably within this ‘racial/ethnic’ framework,\textsuperscript{201} Muslim students were rendered invisible, yet hyper-visible in their role as ‘fundamentalist’ perpetrators.

This same pattern of visibility was iterated in the NUS handbook where mention of Muslims as potential victims of racism pertained to one uncontroversial example referencing lack of halal food provision.\textsuperscript{202} Instead, the report focused on a ‘common threat’ noting that;

UJS...worked with the British organisation of Sikh students, the National Hindu Forum, the National Black Student Alliance against a common threat from Islamic extremists.
The conspicuous absence of FOSIS implied the culpability of Muslim students as ‘common threat.’ This was not only implied by their absence, but explicitly highlighted in a list of ‘extremist’ scenarios that resounded with exemplars from the CVCP report; “anti-Zionism literature on the Jewish notice board”, and a “Sikh girl being verbally abused by Muslim extremists in your foyer.”

Evidently, the CVCP report relied on racialized precedent as the basis for flagging extremism. In detecting ‘extremist’ behavior, it asserted that:

...reasonable belief or suspicion will suffice. This may arise through previous experience, whether at that institution or elsewhere. We do not think it is possible or indeed desirable to attempt to be more specific as to what is meant by reasonable belief or suspicion in this context.

Whilst it also specified that “each particular event must be considered on individual merits or facts,” this appeared inconsistent with the idea that universities could attribute guilt by association through exemplars closely aligned to the purported activities of Muslim students. In response, Tyrer provided the most trenchant conclusion:

the logics of the CVCP report are the logics of all racist miscarriages of justice, recommending that judgements do not even need to be based on fact but simply on patterns of crime assumed to be related to particular groups.

However, unlike more recent Prevent interventions, that have been met with considerable furore for much of the same reasons, notably the racialized precedent upon which Muslim students are rendered suspect, through phenotypical and cultural markers that have been conflated with risky identities, CVCP guidelines have largely slipped under the radar, providing university guidance up until 2005, overlapping with the incipient stages of Prevent. Remarkably, it has inspired comparably little critique, perhaps because it emerged from within, rather that outside the ‘liberal’ academy.

Other elements of the report endorsing disciplinary measures against potentially ‘unruly’ students also appear to have particular students in mind. With clear directives aimed at suppressing political activity; discouraging activism through restricted funds, recommending that student posters or flyers “be presented in English” and ultimately that abiding by such behavior ought to be a precondition for university entry.

Model (Muslim) students were thus not to agitate on matters unrelated to student life and were at risk of being expunged from campus for doing so. The report could therefore be viewed as authorizing disciplinary powers previously considered, later enabled by the widespread view that Muslim ‘extremism’ posed a significant threat to British campuses.

The third aspect of the report inviting criticism was the lack of consultation with Muslim students. Engaging a broad range of parties, consulted bodies indicated no Muslim institution or student group. Gilliat-Ray observed that FOSIS were “sensitive to [their] recent exclusion,” especially considering their “reminder” to the CVCP of their willingness to co-operate. The CVCP denied any bias, maintaining “we took everyone’s view on board,” whilst the NUS confirmed no consultation with Muslim students at any stage.
In hindsight, that neither the CVCP nor the NUS considered it reasonable or even necessary to consult those students whom the report was most likely to adversely affect, did not appear consistent with the spirit of campus harmony and ‘anti-racism’ being rallied across campuses. It also sidestepped the pivotal Islamophobia Report, which universities were in receipt of. Ultimately, this rendered Muslim students collectively subsumed within the ill-defined terms of ‘fundamentalist’ discourse in the report, yet absent as a legitimate consultative constituency and as potential victims of racism. This ‘absentee’ status was consistent with an institutional context which afforded Muslim students in the sector little provision, recognition or recourse in a growing climate of Islamophobia. In this regard, the absence of Muslims on the NUS ‘liberation’ register was mirrored and reified in the structural deficit of universities. Both spheres magnified Muslim identities as excessive, a troubling incursion in the White space of the university.

This exclusion of Muslims did not appear incidental, nor the outcome of an ill-informed or unwitting sequence of practices and procedures. To the contrary, and by the report’s own admission, it had been assembled as a “carefully considered” guide and was in the making for some time; including consultative measures and interim report in 1997 to which various groups, except Muslims, were privy.

**INSTRUMENTALIZING FUNDAMENTALISM; INSTITUTIONALIZING ISLAMOPHOBIA**

The NUS handbook complemented CVCP guidance. In turn, the guidance was reliant on the *Campus Watch* Report, providing impetus for NUS campaigns. These interventions can be understood as key in the ‘fundamentalist’ strategic formation that crystallized in the sector throughout the nineties, each (re)affirming and (re)-enacting the ‘fundamentalist’ threat. That many of the same exemplars of ‘Muslim student fundamentalism’ were replicated across sources illustrated the way they had merged into a singular and seamless regime of truth. However, the focus on such groups, appear somewhat anomalous for this period. Although HT and its splinter group Al-Muhajiroun (AM) were being claimed as a threat, this is a period in which HT had gone into retreat and the emergence of Al-Muhajiroun had notably little credibility or audibility on campuses. This explains why, in spite of increasingly incredulous claims of extremist and sexual violence, Tyrer found little evidence of either, at least nothing remotely worthy of national campaigning. Interestingly, it is the absence of HT, that is noteworthy in this period; something that appeared to be generating a sense of angst amongst some students.

Such interventions thus appear overstated and pre-emptive, functioning to sustain and institutionalize suspicion of Muslim student activity in the absence of a clear empirical base. Consequently, it is the amassed body of ‘knowledge’ circulating campuses that becomes testament to a violent fundamentalist presence, even as these groups were driven underground. Notions of Muslim ‘fundamentalism’ certainly had broad appeal and were instrumentalized outside of NUS politics, and across a diverse range of groups. However, it is the particular cultivation and association of Muslimness within a ‘fundamentalist-
extremist’ assemblage within formalized student politics and accompanying managerial interventions, against a resounding lack of institutional recognition, that represents one of the key ways in which Islamophobia in HE became institutionalized in the nineties.

INHERITING ISLAMOPHOBIA; RESEARCH AND RESOLVE

In the wake of 9/11, the ‘fundamentalist’ scares of the nineties coalesced quite seamlessly with a renewed focus on Muslim extremism. This continued unabated in the NUS. Buttressed with more serious undertones, claims of Muslim extremism were more directly, beginning to inform state interventions in Higher Education. That this shift occurred with considerable ease, perhaps owes much to the ‘existing prism’ in the sector, in which the transgressive Muslim figure had become firmly institutionalized to be later amplified in the aftermath of the July bombings.

In spite of the transient nature of the student lifecycle, it is precisely the burden of these histories during research and the durability of the Muslim extremist ‘apparition’ that prompted greater scrutiny of what had come before. The ‘anti-racist politics’ of that era remained an extant feature of student politics, most exemplified by the absence of a ‘seat’ for Muslims in the anti-racist movement and the routinised racialized assessments about ‘Muslim politics.’ However, this was also a period of political momentum for Muslim students, galvanized by an anti-war movement and significant delegation at NUS Conference (2005), they had begun to steer, rather than form the ‘object’ of debate. Muslim student activism was nonetheless accompanied by a ‘stop and search politics,’ at local and national levels, which often meant students were monitored and patrolled under the White ‘super-surveillance’ of peers (and management) when engaged in political processes. Engaging in traditionally white spaces, Muslim students assumed a scandalous presence. Subject to spurious claims of ‘Muslim militancy’ and in some cases, disenfranchised, they invited a wide range of regulatory practices; nothing to do with the mantle of Prevent or at this point, post 7/7, but an institutional culture of Islamophobia that was tolerated and invariably without recourse. The exercise of racialized governmentality was diffuse and underscored by an absentee status, entrenched in the Race amendment (2000), which ensured Islamophobia need not be accorded recognition.

Prevent had begun to show signs of life in the sector by 2004–2005, and the CVCP report continued to be cited as a means of legislating Muslim student activity. Some university management quite unproblematically resorted to its disciplinary powers, citing some of the report’s specific guidance on ‘free speech’ and ‘external speakers.’ Other staff members referred to it as a ‘guiding’ document pertaining to Muslim students.

Following the July bombings, CVCP guidance was replaced by the ECU’s (Equality Challenge Unit) Promoting Good Campus Relations report. Offering a revised legislative context (RRAA 2000, Employment Equality regulations 2003 and the then forthcoming incitement to religious hatred), it advocated a “case by case” approach, also recognizing increased Islamophobia. Muslim students were identified not simply as perpetrators of hate-crimes but, in a new climate, as its key victims.
This represented a key shift in the (pre)dominant (equality) narratives of the preceding decade. However, whilst welcomed amidst the growing barrage of state directives, the belated inclusion of Muslims as ‘victims’ of ‘hate-crimes’ was working against over a decade of institutionalized stigma and of course, only shortly after, a post 7/7 flurry of governmental interventions. It is in this context, as recalled in the introductory excerpt, that the sector was seen to side-step the “appalling record...of abuses against the Muslim student community.” In view of the period outlined, we can perhaps now appreciate the significance of these claims. This activist invoked a much longer and broader history of institutionalized Islamophobia in HE than the report conceded, and that in the prevailing context, is acknowledged.

CONCLUSIONS; PREVENT AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN THE (NEO)LIBERAL UNIVERSITY

With a fuller view of Muslim student histories, the racialized edifice of Prevent cannot be read as exceptional in the Academy. Whilst the ‘duty’ to survey and report (on Muslims) has predominantly been construed within a discourse of governmental imposition; the de facto monitoring, (micro) surveillance and ‘reporting’ of Muslim students for alleged illegitimate activities long precedes recent governmental intervention. Indeed, the growing and present concern of self-censorship amongst Muslim students resonates so much more profoundly when placed in deeper historical-institutional context, as do contemporary accounts citing the ‘venomous pushback’ against Muslim political participation.

Smith’s observation that the Prevent strategy on campuses has “overshadowed the discourse around the ‘no-platforming’ of Islamist groups” is germane. Although, it is also clear that discourses of Islamophobia have far exceeded such ‘no-platform’ campaigns, becoming embedded within a series of reciprocal institutional interventions that span the sector. In this regard, narrating this period advances critical insight in several key areas.

First it highlights the way, during this period, ‘no-platforming’ as ‘policy and tactic’ detracted from its original purpose; both in serving to amplify, rather than limit HT polemics and in failing to be upheld in the principled anti-fascist tradition of which it was ostensibly a part. In this specific milieu, it arguably exceeded its stated purpose, becoming instrumentalized with Islamophobic effect.

Second, it questions the traditional division between unions and universities, illuminating the circulation and mobility of Islamophobia across various echelons of the campus; an area which deserves further exposition. Third, it questions the nature of institutionalized racism as an unwitting collection of unconscious policy features, or ‘unconscious bias’, but rather, as a strategic practice of racialized regulation, and finally, as a decolonial endeavor, this ‘backstory’ sheds light on the racialized epistemologies upon which truths are produced, named and made ‘fact.’ This is perhaps where it complements scholarship on decolonizing HE, exceeding a canonical focus, to include a broader repertoire of epistemic violence in the ‘liberal campus.’

Thus, contrary to dominant accounts, state imposition in the sector does not represent a radical disjuncture from (pre-)existing discourses associated with ‘Muslim students.’ Rather,
it extends with greater vigor and consequence, entrenched codes of racialized regulation that have been nurtured for at least three decades. Examining Prevent in this context requires one to recalibrate Islamophobias sources, flows and symbiosis with external governmental and ‘para-statist’ agencies and within the intra-politics and racialized asymmetries of the campus.

Hence, a critical reappraisal may well ask where the sites of convergence and complicity reside. For whilst it has been observed that Prevent has merged into the sector with considerable ease, although not homogenously and subsumed into a neoliberal culture of risk aversion and uncertainty, it should also be clear that Prevent has (e)merged into an existing regime of racialized ‘post’-disciplinary power. This is where the subsumption of Prevent racialized logics within White ‘post’-disciplinary institutions warrant greater attention. For it is arguably through a decolonizing ‘post’-disciplinary lens, that Prevents insertion into higher education is rendered visible. Herein Prevents racialized schema can be seen to cohere with the site of the White (neoliberal) university. This is an area that requires further exploration but is perhaps symbolized most cogently in the way in defense to the Home Office, the CVCP report was cited by UUK as evidence of ‘good practice’ in the management of ‘radicalization’.

NOTES

1. Interview: Muslim Postgraduate Student, NUS, (2005).
7. Surveillance of Muslims students in the nineties has been noted, see Mark Hollingsworth and Nick Fielding, Defending the Realm: Inside MI5 and the War on Terrorism (London: Andre Deutsch, 2003) 1–13, 313.
This phase coincides with the authors research on British universities and is detailed elsewhere see; Shaida R Nabi, ’Prevents Early Life; Declassifying Prevent and Muslim Students in Higher Education, 2003-2008’ (Forthcoming).


10. Particularly by Conservative/Counter-Terror think-tanks, for example, Anthony Glees and Chris Pope, When Students Turn to Terror: Terrorist and Extremist Activity on British Campuses (London: Social Affairs Unit, 2005); M Nawaz and E Husain, Preventing Terrorism: Where Next for Britain, Quilliam Foundation (2010).

11. For example, the high-profile case of UCL Graduate, Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallib, for his airline bombing attempt in 2009. Fiona Caldicott, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab: Report to UCL Council of Independent Inquiry Panel, University College London (London, 2010).


16. See for example, this review; Ian Davies et al., ”British Muslim University Students’ Perceptions of Prevent and Its Impact on Their Sense of Identity,” Education, Citizenship and Social Justice 12, no. 2 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1177/1746197916688918.

17. CVCP, Extremism and Intolerance on Campus, Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom (London, 1998).

18. UUK, Roots of Violent Radicalisation; Written Evidence Submitted by Universities UK para 7 (2011).

19. Scott-Bauman et al. study, Islam on Campus, provides the most extensive conceptual/empirical study to date.

20. NUS no-platforming refers to policy and tactics deployed to limit the space, vocality and promotion of those identified as ‘fascist/racist’ groups. See E. Smith, No-platform; a History of Anti-Fascism, Universities and the Limits of Free Speech (Oxon: Routledge, 2020).

21. NUS is the National Union of Students, the representative student body in the UK.

22. CVCP is the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom, the representative body for HE, renamed UUK in 2000.

23. This comprised a total of 66 interviewees. Student interviews were conducted in the Spring academic session 2004/5. This included 41 Muslim students, largely from Islamic societies (ISOCS); 14 university staff members, 9 union officials, one former FOSIS (Federation of Student Islamic Societies) member and one staff member from the ECU.

24. These include Muslim, student/educational and mainstream media.


32. At the time of research, following the Macpherson Report, the statutory race relations amendment (RRAA 2000) had not been applied to student unions in either of the case studies revealing a loophole I raised with the ECU (Interview; ECU Advisor, 2005).


36. See also Saeed and Johnson, “Intelligence.”

37. This is explored elsewhere; Nabi, ’Prevent.’

38. See Scott-Bauman “Ideology and Utopia.”


41. In addition to those already cited, these range in methodology, scope and contention, see for example, H. Fenwick and I. Cram, “Protecting Free Speech and Academic Freedom in Universities,” Modern Law Review 81, 5 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12366; Fahid Qurashi, “Just Get on with...


44. A primary contention has been staff ‘obligations’ to survey and report student behavior and the pedagogical constraints this entails.

45. This is most frequently cited as post 7/7 July bombings, specifically 2007–2011. Thomas, “Youth, Terrorism, and Education.”

46. This frequently involved the Palestinian Question but equally the involvement of Muslim students more generally in their respective unions, anti-racism and within the NUS.


51. Fenwick and Cram, “Protecting Free Speech.”

52. Scott-Bauman et al., Islam on Campus, 9–31.

53. Hypervisibility refers to the way racialized groups are projected into the public sphere through popular stereotyping, yet their status is otherwise characterized by absence or invisibility. Hypervisibility is bound up in dominant forms of racialization, and in the absence of recognition as a legitimate political collective. The site of the university magnifies this social status. See also; D Goldberg, “In/Visibility and Super/Vision,” in Fanon: A Critical Reader, ed. L. Gordon et al. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).


55. See for example, Saeed and Johnson, “Intelligence,” 48; Scott-Bauman et al, Islam on Campus, Chapter 1, 7. 9.


64. N. Massoumi, “Prevent Duty Impact on Universities” (paper presented at the Islamophobia Conference 2016, P21 Gallery London, 10 Dec 2016); Whiting et al., “Prevent Duty,” 5, 10. Although ‘formally’ recognized in the sector, it has been argued that ‘religion’ particularly Islam, remains subordinate to dominant liberal narratives. Scott-Bauman et al., *Islam on Campus*, 11.

65. It is beyond the scope of this contribution to explore ‘post-disciplinary’ institutions. This is partly explored in earlier work, Nabi, ‘Racialised Governmentality,’ 35–39 and refers to the Foucauldian concept of key institutions, working to inculcate social norms within disciplinary enclosures (i.e., schools, prisons) through surveillance, regimentation and classification. How universities are situated in diffuse networks of control and surveillance is especially significant to de-colonial scholarship in which White cultural norms continue to function in exclusionary and disciplinary ways. See M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish; the Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Books, 1977); G Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” *October* 59 (1992). For a broader discussion on Muslims in Control societies, see D. Tyrer, “‘Flooding the Embankments’: Race, Biopolitics and Sovereignty,” in eds. Sayyid and A Vakil, 93–110.

66. There is plenty of literature to dent this myth, one example, Sian, “Navigating.”


82. A grammar which relies on the arbitrary distinction between voluntary (religion) and involuntary identities (‘race’) in which the social contingencies of ‘race’ and racism are denied. Tyrer quoted in N. Meer, “The Politics of Voluntary and Involuntary Identities; Are Muslims in Britain and Ethnic, Racial or Religious Minority?” Patterns of Prejudice 42, no. 1 (2008).
83. Hesse, “Unsettled Multiculturalisms.”
85. Further discussed in Shaida R Nabi, ‘Stop and Search in the Academy; Muslim Students / British Campuses,’ (Forthcoming).
86. Nabi, ‘Racialised Governmentality.’
91. N. Puwar, Space Invaders: Race, Gender and Bodies out of Place (Oxford: Berg, 2004).
92. Hesse, “White Governmentality.”


101. In 1994, they were reported banned on select campuses. Smith, *No-platform* and in 1996 ‘student leaders reported their presence on 50 campuses’ Taji-Farouki, *Fundamental Quest*, 175. These figures ought to be treated with some caution in view of political lobbying and confusion with Hizbollah and the breakaway group Al-Muhajiroun, see; Kylie Connor, “Islamism” in the West? The Life-Span of the Al-Muhajiroun in the United Kingdom,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 25, no.1 (2005); Sadek Hamid, “Islamic Political Radicalism in Britain; the Case of Hizb Ut-Tahrir,” in *Radicalism in Europe*, ed. T Abbas (2007), 148.

102. By the time of research in 2004, HT were banned by the NUS and had disbanded. Hamid, “Islamic Political Radicalism”, 149; Wali, “Hizb,” 57. Although the subject of vociferous lobbying since the early nineties, calls for their proscription have yet to be realized. See N. Hanif, “The Securitization of Hizb ut-Tahrir” (PhD Royal Holloway, University of London, 2014), 247–82.

103. Saeed and Johnson, "Intelligence," 40.

104. McGlynn and McDaid, *Radicalisation*. Recent research indicate that select think-tanks have overinflated their influence in line with security agendas and misrepresented their ideological aspirations seeking to bracket them within a spectrum of violent jihadi groups. Suha Taji-Farouki, “Hizb ut-Tahrir,” in eds, Peters and Rafael, 47–8.


112. In its current configuration, the UJS emerged as a direct response to Palestinian campaigning in the seventies and has since lobbyed as a collective with an “enduring commitment” to Jewish identity and Israel (See http://www.ujs.org.uk/about-us/). See also Sheldon, *Tragic Encounters*, 15,23.


114. The report was jointly co-authored by the NUS and UJS. Searchlight Archives do not currently have any record of *Campus Watch* uploaded. NUS archival material is incomplete.


117. Ibid., 34–35.

121. The NOI received scant coverage for their activities at London Universities; although were reported by some Jewish students to pose a ‘far greater threat.’ K. Ashton, “Keeping Watch on Fascism,” *Independent*, 23rd October 2011 (last updated), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/keeping-watch-on-fascism-1610512.html.
122. Hamid notes HTs distinctive sartorial choices, Hamid, “Islamic Political Radicalism,” 150. However, there are many examples which suggest that those outside of Muslim circles would be hard pressed to make a distinction.
123. The term ‘hate crimes’ is used to reflect the terminology used by academics and the ECU to describe racism on campus at the time. See Tyrer, “Others;” ECU/UUK/SCOP, *Promoting Good Campus Relations: Dealing with Hate Crimes and Intolerance on Campus*, Equality Challenge Unit/Universities UK/Standing Conference of Principals (2005).
126. HT/Muslim students were thought to be the subject of numerous racist hoaxes in this period. Tyrer, “Institutionalized,”176–201.
130. Muslim students, including those (un)involved with Islamic societies, were often in attendance at meetings and motions related to the Palestinian question in the early nineties. Interview; Zakariyah, Former Student 1991–1994, (North Western University.)
133. It has often been remarked that this consciousness was born of competing Muslim groups, see for example, Peter Mandaville, *Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma*, ed. Steven Vertovec (New York: Routledge, 2001) 129–30; Khadijah Elshayyal, *Muslim Identity Politics; Islam, Activism and Equality in Britain* (London: IB Taurus, 2018) 71. That is, against the backdrop of the first Gulf war, the Bosnia genocide and conflict in Afghanistan.
134. In the early nineties for example, the increasingly organized and growing contingent of Muslim students on one campus was said to be causing considerable discomfort to the union executive; this pivoted on interrelated issues of harboring White union space and limiting activism on the Palestinian question. Interview; Zakariyah, Former Student.
136. For example, related by mature students in one case in early 2000, the right to establish a Palestinian Society was denied; amongst other reasons, on grounds that it would ‘provide a platform for terrorism’ and ‘invite racism’ into the union. (Interview; Chris; Haider, Post-graduate Students, 2005, University of Erdon); reasons also evidenced in union minutes. Recent contestation around the ‘enforcement’ of the

137. NUS, Racism, A Light Sleeper, National Union of Students (London, 1999), 36.


140. The relationship between some strains of pro-Israeli/Zionist advocacy and Islamophobia requires greater exploration. It has acquired attention in the ‘War on terror’ in the UK; T. Griffin, D. Miller, and T. Mills, “The Neo-Conservative Movement; Think Tanks as Elite Elements of Social Movements from Above,” in What Is Islamophobia; Racism, Social Movements and the State, ed. N. Massoumi et al. (London: Pluto Press, 2017); although appears less explored prior to 9/11.


143. Taji-Farouki, “Islamists.”


145. One account attributing the murder of a Nigerian student to HT has been dismissed; Elshayyal, Muslim Identity, 71, 236 n.102. Student articles also questioned the violence linked to HT, see for example, T Miles, “Whose Right Is It Anyway?” Leeds Student, 17th November 1995.

146. Carvel, “Ban Urged”; Johnston, “Islamic Extremist.”


149. BMMS, British Muslim Monthly Survey 4, no. 8 (1996).


155. Generating alarm in NATFHE (National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education); “fundamentalist Islamic groups” were seen to “pose the most serious threat” to the safety of gay and lesbian staff and students; Johnston, “Islamic.”

156. Taji-Farouki, “Islamism,” 35.


159. Smith, No-platform, 7.
162. Interview, Stephen, NUS Activist (London 2006).
163. Ibid.
170. J. Murphy, “The Nus Strives for Parity of Tolerance of All Faiths,” Guardian, 14th November 1995, Letters. The critique can be found in Bright, “Politics.”
171. BMMS, 3, 4; 8.
172. CARF (Campaign against Racism and Fascism), posited that a growing anti-fascist movement was broadening its scope to include other marginalized groups ‘at the expense of broader anti-racist action.’ Smith, No-platform, 122.
173. CARF argued that Searchlights ‘one pronged’ focus on anti-Semitism, in a climate of growing anti-Black and anti-Arab hostility was considered detrimental to the anti-racist struggle, eventually leading to their departure from the magazine. See their open letter; Campaign Against Racism and Fascism, “Carf Is Back,” Alert; A New Wave of Anti-Arab Racism, No.1 Feb/March, 1999, https://irr.org.uk/resources/carf-magazine-archive-1991-2003/.
176. For broader discussion, see David Tyrer, The Politics of Islamophobia; Race, Power and Fantasy (Pluto Press, 2013) 35–39.
178. Kahn-Harris and Gidley, Turbulent Times, 149; Sheldon, Tragic Encounters,” 15.
179. BMMS 24.3.1995, Vol 3, no.3, p.5/6. In this period, the lack of an organized presence at National NUS level should not be confused with political apathy amongst Muslim students. Both campus case ISOCS for example had significant (in)formal engagements with their respective unions, notably on prayer-room provisions, from the late eighties, albeit not always successful in the face of increasing Islamophobia, and this invited a range of student interventions. For broader and earlier histories see also; Shaida Nabi, “Federation of Student Islamic Societies, (FOSIS) UK,” in Frank Peter and Rafael Ortega, eds., Islamic Movements in Europe (London: IB Tauris, 2014); Elshayyal, Muslim Identity, 61–62; “Ebrahimsa Mohamed (1937–2017) and Malcolm X’s British Tour in 1964,” 2018, https://medium.com/@yahyabirt/ebrahimsa-mohamed-1937-2017-and-malcolm-xx-british-tour-in-1964-3b43f2de909.
180. Hamid, “Islamic Political Radicalism” 149; Taji-Farouki, Fundamental Quest.
185. Bristow, “Good and Bad Muslims.”
186. BMMS, British Muslim Monthly Survey IV, 3 (March 1996).
187. See for example, R. White and Khush’d, “Unwanted Islamic Irritants,” The Beaver (London Students Union), 22nd October 1996.
188. Tyrer, “Others,” 43; Tyrer, “Muslims.”
189. Further detailed in; Nabi, ‘Stop and Search.’
191. For an account prior to the Duty, see Brown and Saeed, “Radicalisation;” and following the Duty; Scott-Bauman et al., Islam on Campus, 200–203. For an earlier period (2004–2006), iterating similar themes, see Forthcoming, Nabi, ‘Stop and Search’ for a fuller account of Muslim activism in NUS politics.
194. CVCP, Extremism, 5.
196. Ibid.
197. NUS, Light Sleeper, 3.
198. For example, coercion to religious conformity such as dress or praying, attempting to ban another group or society, intimidating or harassing other groups on campus, disrupting meetings and circulating racist leaflets. CVCP, Extremism, 29.
199. Ibid.
201. CVCP, Extremism 12, 29, 44.
202. NUS, Light Sleeper, 36.
203. Ibid., 25, 36.
208. This recommendation is based on earlier guidance (Students Unions: A Guide 1995, DFEE) noting that funds ought to be redirected to “street lighting” rather than “for coaches to transport students to demonstrations.” CVCP, Extremism, 32.50.
210. CVCP, Extremism, 5.
213. CBMI, Islamophobia, 7, 9.


216. Tyrer and Sayyid, “Governing Ghosts.”


224. In this period of retreat (1996–2002), ‘front groups’ are not mentioned in any known literature.


228. Al Muhajiroun were implicated in Chechen terrorism and Muslim students from North Africa and Middle East were being monitored by MI5. J Wilson, A. Chrisafis, and R. Norton- Taylor, “Islamic Militants Seek Foothold on Campus,” *Guardian*, February 24th 2001.

229. MI5’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC) was established in 2003 to monitor and research terror threats. See also, Nabi, ‘Prevent.’

230. During research, the NUS Anti-Racist Committee reserved two positions for Black and Jewish students and one for Irish students, however allowed no representation for Muslim students, although they were an active constituency. This comprised one of a series of irregularities explored in the sequel to this paper. Nabi, ‘Stop and Search.’

231. Nabi, ‘Prevent.’

232. Interview; Janet, North Western University, 2005; Interview; Margaret, Central University 2005.

233. In conjunction with UUK (Universities UK) and SCOP (Standing Conference of Principals). ECU/UUK/SCOP, *Promoting Good Campus Relations: Dealing with Hate Crimes and Intolerance on Campus*.

234. Ibid., 7, 13.

235. Interview; Postgraduate Muslim student, (NUS, 2005).

236. Scott-Bauman et al., *Islam on Campus*; Brown and Saeed, “Radicalisation.”


239. Ibid., 1–36.


245. Scott-Bauman et al., Islam on Campus.

246. UUK, Roots of Violent Radicalisation; para 7.

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